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I. INTRODUCTION
Known colloquially as a “muni,” a municipal bond is issued by a
state or local government as a way of borrowing money.1 The issuing
governmental entity pays interest on the bond principal to the bond
owner.2 If the bond meets certain federal requirements,3 then the interest
∗ Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota); Ruth McGregor Chair of
Teaching Excellence and Visiting Professor, Phoenix School of Law (2009-2010); Commissioner,
Navajo Tax Commission, Navajo Nation (Arizona, New Mexico, Utah); Commissioner, Tesuque
Tax Commission, Tesuque Pueblo (New Mexico); Associate Justice, Court of Appeals, Prairie
Island Indian Community (Minnesota).
1. See JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT TERMS 439 (7th ed. 2006).
2. Kevin M. Yamamoto, A Proposal for the Elimination of the Exclusion for State Bond
Interest, 50 FLA. L. REV. 145, 153 (1998). A bond may be issued with no interest or at a rate of
interest that is too low for the market. These bonds are issued at a discount. This original issue
discount is a form of unstated interest. For example, a $100,000 bond may be issued at no interest
payable in one year. An investor may be willing to pay $96,000 for such a bond and then collect
$100,000 on the date of its maturity one year from issue. Such a bond has original issue discount of
$4,000, which, in effect, is $4,000 of unstated interest. See Calvin H. Johnson, A Thermometer for
the Tax System: The Overall Health of the Tax System as Measured by Implicit Tax, 56 SMU L.
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income that the bond owner receives is excluded from gross income and,
as a result, is not subject to the federal income tax.4 This exemption
from the federal income tax is an important feature of the bond, because
investors are willing to accept a lower interest rate on a municipal bond
than on a bond with fully taxable interest.5 The bond owner looks at the
after-tax yield as an important factor in determining if the municipal
bond is a good investment.6
For example, suppose T, an individual investor who is in the 30
percent federal income tax bracket, has a choice between a $100,000
New York City municipal bond paying 8 percent interest per year for 20
years or a $100,000 General Electric (GE) bond paying 10 percent
interest per year for 20 years. The municipal bond pays $8,000 interest
per year, and the GE bond pays $10,000 per year. Assuming equivalent
credit worthiness for the two borrowers and ignoring the federal income
tax consequences, the GE bond provides T with $2,000 more in interest
income and, therefore, generates a better yield. But once we factor in
the federal income tax, the difference in after-tax yield for the two bonds
shows that the municipal bond is T’s better investment. T would pay no
federal income tax on the $8,000 in interest from the municipal bond,
but T would have to pay $3,000 in federal income tax on the $10,000 in
interest from the GE bond (interest of $10,000 x 30 percent federal
income tax rate is $3,000 in federal income tax). T’s after-tax yield on
the GE bond would be $7,000 per year ($10,000 in interest less $3,000
in federal income tax). The after-tax yield for the GE bond is 7 percent
compared to the 8 percent yield on the municipal bond. All things
considered, the municipal bond is the better investment for T and
provides $1,000 more in after-tax income than the GE bond.7

REV. 41 n.43 (2003). The municipal bond market, however, usually involves bonds that mature a
substantial number of years in the future. As a result, the stated interest rate is usually close to the
actual interest rate when taking original issue discount into account.
3. For general revenue bonds of state and local governments, the requirements involve
arbitrage restrictions and registration requirements. See I.R.C. §§ 148-149 (2006).
4. See I.R.C. § 103(a) (2006). In addition, state and local governments also issue private
activity bonds used to fund private projects of governmental interest. Yamamoto, supra note 2, at
159-60. These bonds are subject to more rules and restrictions. See I.R.C. §§ 141-147 (2006).
5. See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1805 (2008).
6. See id. But see Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 175 (arguing that the investor, not the state or
local government, is capturing most of the tax subsidy by receiving higher yields than one would
expect taking into account the tax-exempt status of the interest income).
7. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 39 (arguing that bonds issued by the federal government
should be used in making comparisons because the level of risk is similar).
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This federal tax exemption operates as an indirect federal subsidy
to state and local governments.8 If the federal government foregoes
income tax revenue on the interest income that a municipal bond
generates, then state and local governments can pay lower rates of
interest on the money they borrow.9 The above example illustrates how
this works: the investor gets a better after-tax rate of return, the city pays
a lower rate of interest, and the federal government does not collect any
federal income tax on the interest income that T earns from the
municipal bond. The magnitude of this indirect federal subsidy, which
is known as a tax expenditure, is approximately $35 billion per year for
the period 2006 to 2012.10
In 1983, Congress decided that federally recognized Indian tribes,
which have many of the infrastructure needs of state and local
governments, should enjoy a comparable federal income tax exemption
for their tribal bonds.11 Congress made the assumption that federal taxexempt status for tribal bonds would lower the borrowing costs of tribes
in the same way that it does for state and local governments.12 The
lower costs of borrowing for tribes would free up more money for tribal
projects. For example, if the Navajo Nation issued tribal bonds at 7
percent interest, and if an individual investor bought one of these bonds
with a principal of $100,000, then the bond owner’s annual interest of
$7,000 would not be subject to the federal income tax because of the rule
that excludes the $7,000 from gross income.13 This is a thumbnail
sketch of the federal income taxation of interest paid on bonds issued by
state, local, and tribal governments.

8. See Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 155.
9. See id. at 148.
10. See Domestic Sports Stadiums: Do They Divert Funds From Critical Public
Infrastructure? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy on Tax Exempt Bond Financing
of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. (2007) (Testimony of Eric
Solomon,
Treasury
Assistant
Secretary
for
Tax
Policy),
9,
available
at
http://domesticpolicy.oversight.house.gov/documents/20071010171553.pdf (indicating a tax
expenditure of $30.9 billion for 2006 growing to $41.1 billion in 2012).
11. See I.R.C. § 7871(a)(4) (2006) (enacted as part of the Indian Tribal Tax Status Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97, 473, § 202, 96 Stat. 2607, 2608 (1983)). For an overview of the legislative
history of this provision, see Ellen P. Aprill, Tribal Bonds: Indian Sovereignty and the Tax
Legislative Process, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 333, 341-48 (1994) (focusing on the restriction that
prohibited tribes from issuing private activity bonds).
12. See Aprill, supra note 11, at 343 n.57 (summarizing congressional testimony indicating
need for tax-exempt bonds).
13. See id. at 348 (criticizing Congress for not allowing tribes to issue private activity bonds
because tribes generally lack the tax base that is necessary to issue general revenue bonds).
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State income taxation of interest on a municipal bond is a little
different. States, like the federal government,14 have the power to tax,15
and most states have an income tax.16 State income tax rates tend to be
much lower than the federal rates.17 Therefore, the question of state
income tax exemption for interest on state, local, and tribal bonds
involves a lower order of magnitude than the federal exemption.18
Nonetheless, all the states with an income tax, except Indiana,19 have
enacted legislation that extends the exemption, but only to their own
bonds.20 As a result, almost all the states with an income tax impose
their tax on interest earned on out-of-state bonds.21
This in-state preference annoyed two taxpayers from Kentucky.22
George and Catherine Davis owned some out-of-state municipal bonds
that paid them interest, and Kentucky imposed its income tax on this
interest income.23 The taxpayers challenged the state’s power to
discriminate in favor of in-state bonds.24 The taxpayers asserted that
Kentucky’s discriminatory form of taxation violated the Dormant
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.25 The text of the
Constitution merely grants Congress the power to “regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.”26 The United States Supreme Court, however, has interpreted
the Commerce Clause text as having a negative implication in instances

14. The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to tax. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 1.
15. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 194 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle ed.,
1976) (noting that the proposed constitution, with the exception of duties on imports and exports,
allowed the states to retain their power to tax “in the most absolute and unqualified sense.” Id.).
16. The nine states without an income tax are: Alaska, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire,
South Dakota, Texas, Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming. See Internal Revenue Service, States
Without a State Tax (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/efile/article/0,,id=130684,00.html.
17. See Federation of Tax Administrators, State Individual Income Taxes (2008) (on file with
author), available at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/ind_inc.pdf (with tops rates ranging from
4.54 percent for Arizona to 9.5 percent for Vermont).
18. See I.R.C. § 1(i) (2006) (providing a top marginal tax rate of 35 percent on federal taxable
income of individuals).
19. Indiana is the only state with an income tax that provides an exemption for all state and
local bonds. See IND. CODE § 6-3-1-3.5 (2008). Utah provides an exemption for state and local outof-state bonds if the sister state exempts Utah bonds. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-114(1)(g), (6)
(2008).
20. See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1806 n.6 (2008).
21. Id. at 1804.
22. Id. at 1807.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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when Congress has not undertaken any direct regulation.27 Now referred
to as the “dormant” Commerce Clause, the Court’s body of case law
provides a broad prohibition against state laws that discriminate against
interstate commerce.28 Over the years, the Court’s Dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence has developed some refinements, including an
exception for state or local laws that further a legitimate governmental
interest apart from economic protectionism.29
In the Kentucky case, the Supreme Court concluded that the public
finance needs of state and local governments justified the state’s income
tax discrimination in favor of its own state and local bonds.30
Accordingly, the state income tax on the interest of out-of-state
municipal bonds did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause and
was, therefore, constitutional. The Davis case did not involve the state
income taxation of tribal bonds. Consequently, a state’s power to tax
interest on tribal bonds remains an open question for those 42 states with
an income tax and an exemption limited to in-state bonds.31 At least one
state has a provision dealing with tribal bonds, but most do not.32
Certainly, some states will assert that their income tax applies to interest
their residents earn on tribal bonds. An added variable is that some
states have tribes within their boundaries, making these tribal bonds
arguably the equivalent to in-state bonds.33
In this article, I use the Davis case as the point of departure for a
critical analytical discussion of a state’s power to impose its income tax
on tribal bond interest. In general, I conclude that states do not have the
27. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1808.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 1808-09.
30. See id. at 1810.
31. For a list of these states, see id. at 1807 n.7.
32. See MINN. STAT. § 290.01(19a)(1)(iii) (2008). This statute provides that for purposes of
determining Minnesota’s income tax exemption for in-state bonds “interest on obligations of an
Indian tribal government described in section 7871(c) of the Internal Revenue Code shall be treated
as interest income on obligations of the state in which the tribe is located.” This provision has the
effect of imposing the Minnesota income tax on all interest income earned by Minnesota taxpayer
on tribal bonds issued by tribes located outside of Minnesota. In addition, interest income earned on
tribal bonds issued by one of the eleven federally recognized Indian tribes located within Minnesota
would be treated the same as interest earned on in-state bonds. California considered enacting such
a provision. See Gail Hall, Analysis of Original Bill (SB 995): Exemption/Interest On Bonds Issued
By Federally Recognized Indian Tribal Government Located Within This State (Franchise Tax
Board, Feb. 22, 2005), available at http://www.ftb.ca.gov/law/legis/05_06bills/sb995_022205.pdf
(copy on file with author) (providing an analysis of a proposed bill to grant tax exemption for
purposes of the California income tax for interest earned by California taxpayers owning a tribal
bond issued by a federally recognized Indian tribe located within California). California never
amended its income tax law to provide an exemption for interest earned on tribal bonds.
33. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, ATLAS OF AMERICAN INDIAN AFFAIRS 42 (1990).
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power to tax this interest for three independent reasons. First, the federal
regulation of tribal bonds is so pervasive that it preempts state taxation
under the Indian preemption doctrine. Second, state taxation of tribal
bond interest adversely affects tribal resources and, therefore, impairs
and infringes tribal sovereignty so substantially that the state power to
tax is rendered invalid. Finally, the Indian Commerce Clause, as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, prohibits discriminatory
state taxation when it involves transactions closely connected to tribes
and to Indian country. These three independent barriers to state income
taxation of tribal bond interest apply whether the tribe issuing the bond
is located within the state or in another state. Arguably, denial of an
exemption for interest from a tribal bond issued by a tribe within a state
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because it is based on a racial category that does not survive strict
scrutiny. I conclude, however, that federally recognized Indian tribes
are distinct political entities under our constitutional framework and that
their special status is political, not racial. Accordingly, states, based on
revenue needs and their legitimate interest in funding their own
governmental projects, have a rational purpose sufficient to survive
Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
In order to provide the fullest consideration of these very
complicated issues, I have divided my discussion into six parts. In the
first part, I discuss specific state statutes to show how their application to
the state income taxation of interest on tribal bonds is textually unclear.
The primary purpose of this part of the discussion is to show that the
analysis must start with the particular state income tax statute itself to
see if it purports to tax the interest income generated by a tribal bond. In
some instances, the more reasonable interpretation of the state statute
may lead to the conclusion that the statute does not impose a tax on the
interest from the tribal bond. None of the relevant statutes contains an
explicit exemption for tribal bonds, although California has proposed
one that it has yet to adopt.34
In Part II, I explore the special treatment of federally recognized
Indian tribes and the broad exemption they enjoy from state taxation
when the legal incidence of a state tax falls on the tribe for activities that
take place wholly or primarily within the tribe’s reservation. I conclude
that the legal incidence of the state income tax falls on the bond owner,
not the tribe. As a result, tribal immunity from state taxation does not
extend to the interest it pays on tribal bonds and therefore, this immunity
34. See id.
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by itself does not bar state income taxation of the interest from the tribal
bond. In Part III, I investigate the application of the Indian preemption
doctrine and conclude that the federal statutes, regulations, and
administrative authority dealing with tribal bonds so occupy the field
that the state’s power to tax tribal bond interest is preempted. The
discussion in Part IV explores whether a state income tax on tribal bond
interest impermissibly infringes tribal sovereignty. The current Supreme
Court has paid little attention to state infringement of tribal sovereignty
and needs to develop meaningful standards for limiting state
encroachment on tribal sovereignty. A state’s taxing power is a good
starting place, especially when this power directly impedes a tribe in its
exercise of an essential governmental function. In Part V, I discuss
application of the Indian Commerce Clause.
Supreme Court
jurisprudence is in its infancy on this question and should expand to
impose a constitutional barrier against states whose taxes discriminate
against tribes. Finally, in Part VI, I discuss whether states that
discriminate against tribes within their borders are engaging in
unconstitutional racial discrimination. I conclude that the discrimination
is political, not racial, and, therefore, does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.
II. ANALYTICAL BEGINNING
When dealing with state taxation of transactions involving Indian
country, the analysis should always start with the state statute and other
sources of state law. This analytical beginning ensures that the best
answers to state law questions come from the state law itself. The
administration of state tax law is in the hands of state tax administrators.
If their state’s tax law, regulations, constitution, or administrative
interpretations provide an answer that is favorable to the taxpayer, then
reliance on federal law becomes unnecessary. Moreover, federal law,
especially federal Indian law, is often unfamiliar to the state tax
administrator. It is safe to assume that a state official does not like being
told that state law is invalid because of federal law. If there is room for
argument, then the state tax administrator may, by nature, adopt the
opposing point of view. In contrast, if the source of law is state law,
then the state tax administrator is more likely to accept it as a rationale
for not taxing the interest on a tribal bond.
In the case of interest from tribal bonds, the text of each individual
state income tax statute requires close reading. Of the 50 states, 41 have
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an income tax.35 The District of Columbia (D.C.) also has an income
tax.36 Of these 42 jurisdictions (41 states and D.C.), only Indiana has a
provision that allows an exemption from its income tax for interest on
bonds from Indiana and from all other states.37 And even in Indiana’s
case, the exemption is by no means explicit as applied to tribal bonds.
Instead, the Indiana exemption requires application of a state statute that
refers to the Internal Revenue Code,38 arguably the most complicated
statute ever written. If someone had to explain Indiana’s income tax
exemption for interest on tribal bonds by reference to a specific statute,
it would be difficult. Instead, the exemption in Indiana arises because its
state income tax adopts federal adjusted gross income as the starting
point for its tax.39 The Indiana modifications to this definition do not
require an adjustment for interest income earned on out-of-state bonds or
on tribal bonds.40 Federal adjusted gross income under the federal
income tax does not include interest on state and local bonds.41 Certain
tribal bonds are defined as state and local bonds for federal income tax
purposes.42 As a result, the income from these tribal bonds is not
included in federal adjusted gross income and, accordingly, is not part of
income for purposes of Indiana’s state income tax.43
Most of the other states with an income tax initially define income,
as does Indiana, by reference to federal adjusted gross income or taxable
income.44 These states, however, then make certain additions to

35. The nine states without an income tax are: Alaska, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire,
South Dakota, Texas, Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming. See Internal Revenue Service, States
Without
a
State
Income
Tax
(2008),
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/efile/
article/0,,id=130684,00.html.
36. See D.C. CODE § 47-1806.01 (2008).
37. Actually, the Indiana income tax defines its tax base as the federal adjusted gross income
of the taxpayer with no adjustments for the federal exclusion for interest on state, local and tribal
bonds. As a result, the federal exclusion is incorporated into Indiana’s definition of its tax base.
See IND. CODE § 6-3-1-3.5 (2008). See also Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801,
1807 n.7 (2008).
38. See I.R.C. §§ 1 – 9833 (2006).
39. See IND. CODE § 6-3-1-3.5 (2008).
40. See id.
41. I.R.C. § 103(a) (2006).
42. I.R.C. § 7871 (2006). Congress recently amended § 7871 to allow tribes to issue private
activity bonds on a limited basis. See I.R.C. § 7871(f) added by § 1402 of the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1402, 123 Stat. 115, 1402.
43. See Scott A. Taylor, An Introduction and Overview of Taxation and Indian Gaming, 29
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 251, 260 (1997).
44. See Michael Mazerov, Dan R. Bucks & Multistate Tax Commission, Federal Tax
Restructuring and State and Local Governments: An Introduction to the Issues and the Literature,
33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1459, 1470 (1996).
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income,45 including interest on state and local bonds from other states.46
This addition has the effect of removing the exemption and subjecting
the interest income from out-of-state bonds to the in-state income tax.
Kentucky, which was the state involved in the Davis case, is a good
example of how this works. Kentucky defines its “adjusted gross
income” as federal adjusted gross income subject to Kentucky’s own list
of subtractions and additions.47 One of these additions is “interest
income derived from obligations of sister states and political
subdivisions thereof.”48 Kentucky’s adjusted gross income is further
reduced by deductions to arrive at “net income,”49 which is then the tax
base on which Kentucky’s income tax is applied. The effect is to
preserve the exemption for interest on in-state bonds while removing the
exemption for out-of-state bonds. What about tribal bonds?
The text of the Kentucky statute is “obligations of sister states and
political subdivisions thereof.”50 This language makes no specific
reference to tribal bonds. As a result, a Kentucky taxpayer who owns a
$100,000 Navajo Nation bond earning $7,000 in interest each year
legitimately could argue that this $7,000 of interest income is exempt
from the Kentucky income tax. The taxpayer’s argument is fairly
logical. The federal income tax defines a tribal bond as being a state or
local bond.51 The federal statute that excludes municipal bond interest
income from the bond owner’s federal gross income also excludes the
interest income from the Navajo bond, because it is treated the same as a
state or local bond for federal income tax purposes.52 As a result, the
Navajo bond owner’s federal adjusted gross income does not include the
interest from the Navajo bond. Kentucky’s definition of its adjusted
gross income incorporates the federal definition of adjusted gross
income.53 The Kentucky adjustment that adds municipal bond interest
back into Kentucky adjusted gross income extends only to an “obligation
of a sister state.”54 If the Navajo Nation is not a sister state, then the

45. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 290.01(19) (2008) (defining Minnesota net income as federal
taxable income as defined in I.R.C. § 63 (2006)).
46. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 290.01(19a)(1)(i) (2008) (adding “interest income on obligations
of any state other than Minnesota” that is otherwise exempt under federal income tax law).
47. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(10) (West 2008).
48. See id at § 141.010(10)(c).
49. See id. at § 141.010(11).
50. See id at § 141.010(10)(c).
51. See I.R.C. § 7871(a)(4) (2006).
52. See I.R.C. § 103(a) (2006).
53. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(10) (West 2008).
54. See id. at § 1.41.010(10)(c).
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Navajo Nation bond is not an “obligation of a sister state” for purposes
of the Kentucky statute. Accordingly, the interest income paid to the
Kentucky taxpayer who owns the Navajo bond need not be added back
into Kentucky adjusted gross income under this line of argument.
Kentucky, however, may very well argue that the Navajo Nation is
a sister state under its statute. If Kentucky takes this position, then the
question becomes whether a federally recognized Indian tribe is a “sister
state” for purposes of the Kentucky statute. The Kentucky statute itself
provides no definition of “sister state” or Indian tribe. The state tax
authorities in Kentucky are working on a fairly clean slate. And the state
courts would not have much to go on. Therefore, Kentucky might turn
to federal law for guidance. The most relevant place to start would be
section 7871(a)(4) in the Internal Revenue Code. This section treats
tribal bonds the same as state and local bonds by saying that an “Indian
tribal government shall be treated as a State . . . for purposes of Section
103 (relating to State and local bonds).”55 Section 103 of the Internal
Revenue Code provides the exclusion from gross income for interest
earned on state and local bonds. And it is the effect of Section 103 that
caused Kentucky to require the addition of interest from bonds of sister
states. Whether these federal statutes are sufficient to transform the
Navajo Nation into a sister state for purposes of the Kentucky statute is
entirely unclear. The federal statute, however, does provide Kentucky
with an argument that the Navajo Nation should be treated the same as
other states, at least for this limited purpose of imposing Kentucky’s
income tax. Ultimately, Kentucky tax authorities have the initial
responsibility for interpreting Kentucky tax law. My guess is that they
will treat the Navajo Nation bond the same as a bond from New York.56
A number of other states use language similar to Kentucky’s
statute, which starts with the federal definition of taxable income, but
then adds back interest earned on out-of-state bonds. New York and
Montana are good examples. New York’s add-back language applies to
“interest income on obligations of any state other than this state . . . .”57
The add-back language is limited to states (and their political
subdivisions). Therefore, it arguably does not extend to tribes. Montana
adopts similar language, but actually adds back all interest from all states

55. I.R.C. § 7871(a)(4) (2006).
56. Kentucky has no federally recognized Indian tribes within its borders. Therefore,
consideration of the treatment of in-state tribal bonds for Kentucky is irrelevant. See PRUCHA, supra
note 33, at 42.
57. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(b)(1) (McKinney 2006).
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and then excludes obligations of Montana.58 For states with statutes like
Kentucky, New York, or Montana, the state income taxation of interest
on tribal bonds is unclear and requires statutory interpretation.
Other states follow the Kentucky approach, but they use
substantially different language in defining the bonds whose interest is
subject to taxation. Arizona is a good example. Its statute applies to
“obligations of any state, territory or possession of the United States, or
any political subdivision thereof, located outside the state of Arizona.”59
The Arizona language is more expansive and applies to territories and
possessions of the United States together with their political
subdivisions. This language could extend to Indian tribes if they are
viewed as territories or possessions of the United States. Arizona case
law suggests that the state courts do not view tribes as territories or
possessions.60 Other states, in other legal contexts, have viewed tribes as
having the same legal status as a territory.61 This ambiguity in the
statutory language means that the treatment of interest on tribal bonds is
unclear. An additional complication in the Arizona language is that it
could be construed as allowing an exemption for tribes located within
Arizona. Arizona has federally recognized tribes wholly or partly within
its boundaries.62 Accordingly, the “outside the state of Arizona”
language may mean that only those tribes outside of the state are covered
by the special provision.
The statutory rules for Arkansas provide a clear case in which the
state income tax will apply to interest paid on tribal bonds. Gross
income is broadly defined and includes interest income.63 Specifically
excluded from gross income is any interest earned on “obligations of the
State of Arkansas or any political subdivision.”64 Under this statutory
framework, interest on a tribal bond is included within the generic
definition of “interest” but not subject to a specific exclusion that applies
only to in-state bonds. Accordingly, the tribal interest would be subject
to the Arkansas income tax. Alabama uses a statutory approach that is

58. See MONT. CODE ANN.§ 15-30-2110(1)(a)(i) (2009) (adding back “interest received on
obligations of another state”).
59. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1021(3) (2008).
60. See Scott A. Taylor, Enforcement of Tribal Court Tax Judgments Outside of Indian
Country: The Ways and Means, 34 N.M. L. REV. 339, 358-59 (2004).
61. See id. at 361-62.
62. See PRUCHA, supra note 33, at 42.
63. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-51-404(a)(1)(D) (2009).
64. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-51-404(b)(5) (2009).
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similar to Arkansas relying first on a broad rule of inclusion65 and then
providing a narrow rule of exclusion for in-state bonds.66
Colorado takes yet another approach. Starting with the federal
definition of taxable income, it adds back all interest income excluded
by federal law, except for interest earned on in-state bonds.67 This
approach clearly subjects interest on tribal bonds to the Colorado income
tax. Those states following the Colorado approach include Delaware,68
Georgia,69 and Idaho.70
The important point here is that the precise language varies for each
state statute dealing with the income tax treatment of interest on bonds
exempt under the Internal Revenue Code. In some states, the taxpayer
has a good argument that the text of the state income tax law actually
exempts interest on tribal bonds. In other states, the text seems
unambiguous and extends taxation to tribal bonds. Taxpayers who own
tribal bonds should carefully read the state statute dealing with their
state’s income taxation of interest on bonds that are exempt from the
federal income tax.
III. STATE TAXATION OF FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED INDIAN TRIBES
As a general proposition, states cannot tax tribes for activities that
tribes undertake within their own reservations.71 If a tribe engages in
activity off its reservation, then a state is free to tax that activity unless
Congress restricts the state power.72 In addition, a state can tax a nonmember, non-Indian on transactions on or off the reservation involving a
tribe or its members unless Congress restricts the state power.73 These
65. See ALA. CODE § 40-18-4 (2009).
66. See ALA. CODE § 40-18-14(3)(f) (2009).
67. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-104(3)(b) (2009).
68. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1106(a)(1) (2009).
69. See GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-27(b)(1)(A) (2009).
70. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3022M(1), (3)(b) (2009).
71. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 459 (1995) (holding that
where “the legal incidence of an excise tax rests on a tribe . . . for sales made inside Indian country,
the tax cannot be enforced absent clear congressional authorization.”); Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973) (“In the special area of state taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction
or other federal statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian
reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on within reservation boundaries.”).
72. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U.S. at 149 (concluding that the State of New Mexico
“retained the right to tax, unless Congress forbade it, all Indian land and Indian activities located or
occurring” outside of the tribe’s reservation).
73. See Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005) (allowing the
imposition of a state fuel excise tax on off-reservation sales by non-Indian wholesalers to a tribe that
owned and operated a gas station within its own reservation); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (allowing the imposition of a state severance tax on the extraction of
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three rules seem relatively simple. Unfortunately, their application is
often difficult because deciding on whom the tax falls is difficult74 and
because locating the transactions on or off the reservation depends on all
the facts and circumstances.75 In addition, Congress rarely provides an
explicit rule preempting state taxation.76
A. Tribal Immunity from State Taxation
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a tribe is
immune from state taxation for activities undertaken within its own
reservation. The Court first acknowledged77 this principle of immunity
in 1973 when it decided Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones.78 The issue
in Mescalero was New Mexico’s power to impose its gross receipts tax
on the tribe’s sale of goods and services79 in connection with the
operation of a ski resort located just outside the reservation boundary.80
The Court permitted the imposition of the state tax because the activity
oil and gas produced by a non-Indian lessee of the tribe on tribal lands but sold to buyers located off
the reservation); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898) (allowing the imposition of a territorial tax
imposed on cattle owned by non-Indians where the cattle were located on the reservation under
grazing leases entered into with the tribe).
74. See, e.g., Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 101-5 (discussing the arguments about legal incidence,
including those made by the United States as amicus curiae in favor of the tribe, which the Court
rejected); Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 461 (noting that that the state tax statute in question did
“not expressly identify who bears the tax’s legal incidence” thereby requiring the Court in “the
absence of such dispositive language” to undertake a fair interpretation of the statute).
75. See Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160, 164-65 (1980) (finding
that a sale to a tribe by a non-resident, non-Indian vendor was preempted by the federal Indian
Trader Statute because the transaction was primarily located within the reservation). Justice
Stewart’s dissent in Central Machinery shows that a minority of the Court believed that the business
location of the vendor was an important factor that should have allowed the state to impose a tax on
the transaction. Id. at 169-70.
76. See, e.g., Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832, 839-40 (1982)
(involving consideration of the four different pieces of federal legislation, none of which contained
a specific provision dealing with federal preemption of state taxation); White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145-46 (1980) (involving federal legislation and regulation dealing
with the sale of timber located on Indian lands); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n,
380 U.S. 685, 688-89 (1965) (involving federal legislation that regulated Indian traders).
77. Arguably, the United State Supreme Court’s decision in Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264
(1898), raised the issue by negative implication. The case involved a tax imposed by the Territory
of Oklahoma on cattle owned by non-Indians. Id. at 268. The cattle owners entered into grazing
leases with the Osage and Kansas Indians, and the cattle being taxed were on Indians lands. Id. at
272-73. The Court found that “a tax put upon the cattle of the lessees is too remote to be deemed a
tax upon the lands or privileges of the Indians.” Id. at 273. This quote implies that a direct tax on
the tribe would have been invalid.
78. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973) (indicating that states cannot
tax tribes or their members for on-reservation activity unless Congress provides authorization).
79. See id. at 146-47.
80. See id. at 146.
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was located off the reservation81 and because no federal statute restricted
the state’s power to tax.82
The Court’s opinion, written by Justice White, said virtually
nothing about the underlying basis of the general principle that a tribe is
immune from state taxation on activity within its reservation.83 Instead,
Justice White spent considerable time rejecting the theory that a tribe is
an instrumentality of the federal government.84 Under this theory, the
tribe would have enjoyed immunity from state taxation whether its
activity was on or off the reservation.85 The only whiff of a rationale
that Justice White offered was his citation to McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Commission.86 Justice White’s reliance on McClanahan was
entirely misplaced because that case did not involve state taxation of the
tribe. He failed to recognize that members of the tribe are individuals
who are distinct from the tribe, which is a political entity. He has left us
with a rule devoid of a rationale. The dissent of Justice Douglas in
Mescalero added nothing to the rationale justifying on-reservation
immunity for the tribe.87
The Court did not address a tribe’s immunity from state taxation
again until 1995 in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation.88
The case involved Oklahoma’s attempt to impose its state tax on motor
fuels sold on the reservation at a gas station owned and operated by the
Chickasaw Nation.89 Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the Court
and merely stated that existing Supreme Court case law90 required a
81. See id. at 148-49.
82. See id.
83. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
84. See id. at 150-55.
85. See id. at 150 (rejecting the assertion that the ski resort was a federal instrumentality and
immune from state taxation even though it was located off the reservation).
86. See id. at 148 (observing that the McClanahan case “lays to rest any doubt in this respect
by holding that [state taxation of Indian lands or income] . . . is not permissible absent congressional
consent.”). McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), was decided the
same day as Mescalero and involved Arizona’s attempt to impose its income tax on a member of the
Navajo Nation who lived on the reservation and who worked for the tribe. Id. at 165-66.
87. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U.S. at 159-63 (arguing that the federal legislation
permitting the tribe’s building of the ski resort preempted the state’s power to tax).
88. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995).
89. See id. at 452-53. The case also involved the question of whether Oklahoma could
impose its income tax on tribal members who worked for the tribe but who lived off the reservation.
On this issue, the Court held in favor of Oklahoma. See id. at 462-67.
90. See id. at 458 (citing two cases to support Justice Ginsberg’s conclusion that a tribe is
immune from state taxation, Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) and McClanahan v. Ariz.
State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), even though both cases dealt with state taxation of
individual tribal members). Justice Ginsburg, like Justice White, seems to equate tribal members
with the political entity of the tribe.
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categorical approach to state taxation of the tribe, which meant that
Oklahoma could not impose its tax on gasoline sold by the Chickasaw
Nation at its gas station located on its reservation.91 Oklahoma had
unsuccessfully urged that the Court should balance the federal, state, and
tribal interests before deciding whether the state tax was justified.92
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion provided no underlying rationale for the
Chickasaw Nation’s immunity. She merely observed that the immunity
is a preexisting condition that Congress can modify.93
Justice Ginsburg did add one refinement to the analysis: legal
incidence. I discuss legal incidence more fully in the next section. The
point here, after Justice Ginsburg’s refinement, is that a tribe is not
immune from a state tax unless its legal incidence falls on the tribe. For
purposes of a tribe’s immunity from state taxation, the economic
incidence or burden of the tax is no longer relevant. A tribe enjoys
immunity from the state tax only if the legal incidence of the tax falls on
the tribe.94 The legal incidence refinement that Justice Ginsburg added
to the mix provides no help in understanding the rationale behind the
general rule. Instead, the rule is now just more complicated: a tribe is
immune from state taxation when the legal incidence of the tax falls on
the tribe and when the activity takes place on the reservation, unless
Congress otherwise authorizes the tax.
The first United States Supreme Court case in which a state was
permitted to tax a tribe was Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of
Chippewa Indians.95 In Leech Lake, a large percentage of the lands
within the tribe’s reservation had been allotted and sold to non-Indians
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.96 During the
1980s, the Leech Lake Band began buying private lands within its
reservation when these lands went up for sale.97 In the early 1990s, Cass
County began imposing its property tax on these parcels.98 The County
argued that Congress had authorized the imposition of the local property
tax through various federal statutes.99 The Court, in an opinion written

91. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458 (1995).
92. See id. at 457-58.
93. See id. at 457.
94. See id. at 458-59.
95. See Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998).
96. See id. at 106. In 1977, the tribe and its members owned only 5 percent of the lands
within the reservation boundaries. See id. at 108.
97. See id. at 108.
98. See id. at 108.
99. See Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 109 (1998).
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by Justice Thomas, concluded that the County was correct.100 His
reasoning reaffirmed the requirement that state taxation of tribal lands
was permitted only if Congress had made its intention to permit such
taxation “unmistakably clear.”101 Justice Thomas articulated the
appropriate standard, but he failed to see that Congress did not authorize
state property taxation within the narrow facts of this case when the
Leech Lake Band owned the land within its own reservation
boundaries.102 In any case, Leech Lake reaffirmed the principle that a
state cannot tax a tribe’s reservation lands unless Congress authorizes
such taxation in legislation that makes this unmistakably clear. Finally,
the opinion provided no rationale for the general rule that a tribe is
immune from state taxation for on-reservation activity.
The other Supreme Court case in this area is City of Sherrill v.
Oneida Indian Nation.103 In City of Sherrill, local property taxation was
once again the issue. In this case, the Oneida Indian Nation purchased
properties within the boundaries of the City of Sherrill in New York.104
The lands were within the tribe’s 300,000 acre reservation that continues
to be the subject of an ongoing land claim in which the Oneida Nation
asserts that its title was wrongfully terminated by the State of New York
starting in the 1790s in violation of federal law.105 The Supreme Court
previously confirmed these claims.106 The Oneida Nation’s argument in
its property tax case was simple. The lands owned by the tribe were
located within its historic reservation, and final settlement of those
claims was still pending.107 The Oneida Nation asserted that it should be
free from the local property tax unless the City of Sherrill could point to
a specific federal statute authorizing the tax.108 The Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Ginsburg, found that the tribe had no immunity
because its sovereignty over the lands in question had terminated, even

100. See id. at 113.
101. See id. at 110.
102. See Scott A. Taylor, State Property Taxation of Tribal Fee Lands Located Within
Reservation Boundaries: Reconsidering County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation and Leech Band of Chippewa Indians v. Cass County, 23 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 55, 92-95 (1998/99) (explaining how Congress has never authorized state taxation of lands
owned by a tribe within its own reservation even when tribal ownership is reacquired following a
period when the lands were taxable when not owned by the tribe).
103. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
104. See id. at 202.
105. See id. at 204-05.
106. See id. at 208-09.
107. See id. at 213.
108. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 213-14 (2005).
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though its claims for relief were still very much alive.109 In substance,
Justice Ginsburg relied on a “laches” line of reasoning that essentially
penalized the Oneida Nation for not making a timely claim of
sovereignty over the disputed lands.110 Of greater interest for purposes
of this article, Justice Ginsburg added nothing to the still blank slate on
the rationale for tribal immunity from state taxation.111
The Court has had opportunities in these four cases to explain its
rationale for tribal tax immunity. The Court has neglected to provide a
rationale. Given its next opportunity, the Court should adopt a rationale
for its immunity rule. I propose this rationale:
State taxation of a federally recognized Indian tribe destroys the
tribe’s political integrity and sovereignty, which the United States,
through treaties, agreements, and legislation, has promised to preserve
and to protect. The aboriginal sovereignty of every federally
recognized Indian tribe includes immunity from state taxation, which
can be imposed only if authorized by treaty, granted through separate
consent of the tribe, or allowed by federal legislation.

Justice White, when referring to a tribe’s power to tax, outlined a
similar line of reasoning in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Indian Reservation.112 He said that a tribe’s power to tax “is a
fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless
divested of it by federal law or necessary implication of their dependent
status.”113 I would part company with Justice White’s reliance on
divestiture through “dependent status” as a means of reducing a tribe’s
aboriginal power to tax. Likewise, I would reject “dependent status” as

109. See id. at 214 (stating that federal Indian law and federal equity practice “preclude the
Tribe from rekindling embers of sovereignty that long ago grew cold.”).
110. See id. at 214-15.
111. Interestingly, Justice Ginsburg describes the Oneida Nation as seeking “declaratory and
injunctive relief recognizing its present and future sovereign immunity from local taxation on
parcels of land the Tribe purchased.” Id. at 214. The use of the phrase “sovereign immunity”
instead of “immunity from taxation” or “tax immunity” suggests that the Oneida Nation at least was
making a connection between its sovereign immunity and its immunity from state taxation.
112. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
113. See id. at 152. In terms of the tribe’s power to tax in the Colville case, the Court
concluded that such power was not inconsistent with the national power of the United States and,
therefore, was not divested by the dependent status of the tribe. For a discussion of “dependent
status” and the application of “implicit divestiture,” see John P. LaVelle, Implicit Divestiture
Reconsidered: Outtakes from the Cohen's Handbook Cutting-Room Floor, 38 CONN. L. REV. 731
(2006). From a judicial point of view, the United States Supreme Court described tribes as
“domestic dependent nations” in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831)
(confirming their political independence but noting that the language of treaties places them under
the protection of the United States).
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somehow providing a justification for state taxation of a tribe.114
Instead, the focus should be on explicit authorization from Congress.115
In any case, the core of the rationale for tribal tax immunity should be
the preservation of tribal sovereignty.116
B. Tribal Activities “Off” the Reservation
As I discussed in the preceding section, the Mescalero case found
that “off” reservation activity of a tribe enjoyed no immunity from state
taxation unless Congress by legislation limited the state’s power to
tax.117 In Mescalero, placing the activity “off” the reservation was
straightforward because the ski resort was located on lands just outside
the Mescalero Apache reservation.118 Likewise, in locating the gas
station owned and operated by the Chickasaw Nation within its
reservation was factually uncomplicated.119 In many cases, however,
placing a transaction “on” or “off” a reservation will be difficult because
one transaction may be composed of parts and stages that will have a
connection both on and off the reservation.
A good example of this possible difficulty is Central Machinery
Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission.120 Although Central Machinery
involved state taxation of a non-Indian and the preemptive effect of the
federal Indian trader statute, the location of the transaction “on” the
reservation was critical to the outcome.121 The underlying transaction
involved Central Machinery’s sale of equipment to the Gila River Indian

114. Indeed, the opinion of Justice Thomas in Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa
Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998) stated that the intent of Congress to authorize state and local taxation
of Indian reservation land must be “unmistakably clear.” See id. at 110.
115. Even here, I must add that Congress should not unilaterally divest tribes of their
sovereignty. If Congress authorizes state taxation of tribes, then the sovereignty of tribes
diminishes.
116. Two interesting examples of Congress preserving immunity are Public Law 280 and the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Public Law 280, which had the effect of shifting criminal
jurisdiction within Indian country from the federal government to enumerated states, specifically
provided that “[n]othing in this section shall authorize . . . taxation of any real or personal property .
. . belonging to any Indian or Indian tribe.” Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 2, 67 Stat.
588, 589 (1953) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (2006)). The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act has a
similar provision. This provision states that “nothing in this section shall be interpreted as
conferring upon a State . . . authority to impose any tax . . . upon an Indian tribe.” Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, § 11(d)(4), 102 Stat. 2472, 2477 (1988).
117. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973).
118. See id. at 146.
119. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995).
120. See Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
121. See id. at 165.
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Community.122 Central Machinery was located off the reservation, but
its salesman solicited the sale on the reservation.123 In addition, the
signing of the contract, the payment, and the delivery all took place on
the reservation.124 This led the Court to conclude that the Indian trader
statute preempted the Arizona tax.125
In the case of tribal bonds, much of the work will be done both
“on” and “off” the reservation. Certainly, the central purpose of the
bond issuance is to borrow money to fund governmental projects of the
tribe. Accordingly, the physical results of the use of the borrowed funds
will be on the reservation (schools, roads, government buildings, water
supply projects, waste water treatment facilities). In contrast, the bond
underwriter and the bond purchasers probably will be located off the
reservation. Locating the bond issue “on” or “off” the reservation is not
so easy given that Mescalero and Central Machinery are the only cases
that have addressed the question.126
C. Legal Incidence
The concept of “legal incidence” of a tax has its practical
application primarily in the context of intergovernmental tax immunity.
Intergovernmental tax immunity is a constitutional concept whose
genesis comes from the early nineteenth century case of McCulloch v.
Maryland.127 In McCulloch, the tax issue became constitutional because
Justice John Marshall viewed Maryland’s tax on bank notes issued by a
federally chartered bank as a state tax on the functioning of the federal
government.128 Justice Marshall concluded that such a power could not
exist because “the power to tax involves the power to destroy,”129
meaning that a state could theoretically destroy the federal government
with such a taxing power. Justice Marshall reasoned that the
Constitution assumed that the federal government would be immune

122. See id. at 161.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160, 164 (1980).
126. See Scott A. Taylor, A Judicial Framework for Applying Supreme Court Jurisprudence to
the State Income Taxation Of Indian Traders, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 841, 898-901 (2007)
(discussing the on/off distinction in the context of the income taxation of Indian traders).
127. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
128. See id. at 432 (equating the state taxation of the bank’s bonds with state taxation of the
U.S. mails, which, according to Justice Marshall, would be inappropriate).
129. See id. at 431.
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from state taxation because the states never possessed the power to tax
the federal government.130
The federal immunity from state taxation became a reciprocal rule,
one providing state immunity from federal taxation, when the United
States Supreme Court, in Collector v. Day,131 held that Congress could
not impose a federal income tax on the salary of a state judge from
Massachusetts.132 In the Day case, the Court assumed that a federal
income tax on a state judge’s salary paid by Massachusetts was a tax on
Massachusetts because the judge’s state function and his salary were
viewed as inseparable.133 The Day case spawned substantial litigation
during the 1920s and 1930s under the federal income tax.134 These cases
looked at the state’s payment of income to employees and how the
imposition of the federal income tax caused an economic burden on the
state.135 The United States Supreme Court reconsidered the soundness
of its economic burden analysis in 1938 in Helvering v. Gerhardt136 and
concluded that the actual burden on the state was not shown and more
likely fell on the individual.137 The Court further noted that exemption
from the federal income tax produced a windfall for the individual
taxpayer with only an insubstantial or speculative benefit for the state.138
The next year the Court used the same reasoning to allow state income
taxation of a federal employee in Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe.139
The concept of legal incidence, as the analytical linchpin in the
context of intergovernmental tax immunity, did not reach its full flower,
however, until 1982, when the Court, in United States v. New Mexico,140
decided that the legal incidence of a tax, and not its economic burden,
was the decisive factor in deciding whether the federal government was
immune from a state tax.141 In the New Mexico case, contractors with

130. See id. at 430 (concluding that the states never possessed the power to impede federal
governmental activity through taxation).
131. Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871).
132. Id. at 126.
133. See id. at 122-23.
134. For some of these cases, see Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, n.6 (1938).
135. See id.
136. See id. at 405.
137. See id. at 420.
138. See id.
139. See Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 480 (1939) (stating that the theory that “a tax on
income is legally or economically a tax on its source, is no longer tenable”). See id. at 480.
140. See United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982).
141. See id. at n.11 (“With the abandonment of the notion that the economic – as opposed to
the legal – incidence of the tax is relevant, it becomes difficult to maintain that federal tax immunity
is designed to insulate federal operations from the effect of state taxation.” Id.).
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the federal government procured goods and service for the benefit of
United States, and New Mexico imposed its gross receipts tax on these
sales.142 The purchases were paid directly by the federal government
under a contractual arrangement with the contractors.143 Clearly, then,
the economic burden of these state taxes fell directly on the United
States. The Court, however, found that the contractors were not federal
instrumentalities144 and that the “legal incidence” of the New Mexico
gross receipts tax fell on the contractors145 and not on the United States.
Absent from the opinion in the New Mexico decision was any discussion
of the meaning of the “legal incidence” concept. In summarizing the
state of the case law as it addressed the issue in a related case four years
earlier, the Tenth Circuit noted that the concept of “legal incidence” had
“never been explicitly formulated by the Supreme Court.”146 And the
Supreme Court in its New Mexico opinion developed the concept of
“legal incidence” no further because the United States had conceded that
the legal incidence of the New Mexico gross receipts tax fell on the
contractors and not on the United States.147
By 1988, the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the
federal income taxation of interest on state and local bonds in South
Carolina v. Baker.148 South Carolina asserted that a federal income tax
on the interest of its bonds was a direct tax on the state and therefore
unconstitutional under the doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity.149 The Court rejected this argument and found that the tax, if
imposed, would be paid by the bondholders on whom the legal incidence
of the tax would fall.150 The Court acknowledged that the state would
have to pay a higher interest rate, but that this would be an
administrative cost, not a tax.151
In 1995, with the Supreme Court’s decision in Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Chickasaw Nation,152 the “legal incidence” concept
became part of the federal case law dealing with tribal immunity from

142. See id. at 728.
143. See id.
144. See United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 735 (1982).
145. See id. at 738.
146. United States v. New Mexico, 581 F.2d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1978) (involving contractors
dealing with the federal White Sands Missile Range).
147. United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 738 (1982).
148. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
149. See id. at 508.
150. See id. at 526.
151. See id.
152. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995).
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state taxation. In the Chickasaw Nation case, Oklahoma attempted to
impose its fuel excise tax on sales of gasoline made by the Chickasaw
Nation at its convenience stores located on the reservation.153 Relying
on the legal conclusion drawn by the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court
found that the legal incidence of the Oklahoma fuel excise tax fell on the
Chickasaw Nation and not on the wholesaler or the final consumer.154
Oklahoma contested the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion,155 but the Supreme
Court felt that the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion had been reasonable.156
Justice Ginsburg, who wrote the opinion for the Supreme Court, hailed
the “legal incidence” test as a “bright-line standard” that would aid tax
administration.157 Absent from the discussion is any meaningful
definition of “legal incidence.” And Justice Ginsburg’s discussion of the
issue shows that the Oklahoma statute in question was not clear on legal
incidence, and that the federal court of appeals was left with the chore of
interpreting this state tax statute.158 Finally, Justice Ginsburg noted that
“legal incidence” allows a certain amount of flexibility if a state is
willing to amend its taxing statute so that the text of the law places the
legal incidence of the fuel excise tax on a person other than the tribe.159
Indeed, Kansas availed itself of this flexibility to insure that the
legal incidence of its fuel excise tax would not fall on the tribe. In this
way, the tribe would have no tax immunity. In Wagnon v. Prairie Band
Potawatomi Nation,160 Kansas wrote its fuel excise tax statute so that the
tax would fall on off-reservation wholesalers before delivery to gas
stations owned by tribes.161 In this case, the Prairie Band of the
Potawatomi Nation owned a gas station operated primarily as a
convenience for customers driving to and from the Nation’s casino.162
The Court found that the legal incidence of the fuel excise tax applied to
wholesalers off the reservation before they sold their fuel to the gas
station of the Nation.163 Accordingly, the Wagnon decision shows that
the “legal incidence” test makes the doctrine of intergovernmental
153. See id. at 455.
154. See id. at 460.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 461.
157. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 460 (1995).
158. See id. at 461.
159. See id. at 460.
160. Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
161. See Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 379 F.3d 979, 982 (10th Cir. 2004)
(indicating that Kansas amended its fuel excise tax statute so that the legal incidence would shift in
a way so that it could tax on-reservation sales of gasoline).
162. See Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 99.
163. See id. at 102-03.
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immunity essentially meaningless in those cases where the particular
government is willing and able to change its tax statute so that the legal
incidence shifts to a person who does not enjoy immunity.
Almost all individual income taxes are written in a way so that the
individual taxpayer’s income is the subject of the tax for which the
individual has final liability of payment.164 Nonetheless, it is common
for income tax systems to use withholding at the source so that payers of
income are responsible for initial withholding and payment of the
income tax.165 This is true in the United States where employers are
responsible for withholding and paying the federal income tax on the
wages of their employees.166 If an employer neglects to withhold and
pay, then the employer faces financial liability for non-payment even
though the income tax is a personal liability of the employee.167 Even
with this additional legal liability for employers, we still assume that the
legal incidence of the federal income tax is on the individual. We make
the same assumption for state income taxes.
In the case of interest on bonds, the payer has no obligation to
withhold and pay the federal income tax on the interest income earned
by the bond owner.168 However, the bond issuer has an obligation to
report to the Internal Revenue Service the amount of interest that it paid
to each bond owner.169 The bond owner, then, has the obligation to
report this interest on the income tax form and to pay any resulting
federal income tax liability.170 Before 2006, the issuer of a municipal
bond had no obligation to report the amount of interest paid to each bond

164. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6012(a) (2006) (requiring individuals to file federal income tax
returns); I.R.C. §§ 6151(a) (2006) (requiring payment of the tax by the person making and filing the
return); MINN. STAT. § 289A.31(1)(A) (2009) (individual income tax “must be paid by the taxpayer
upon whom the tax is imposed”); N.M. STAT. §§ 7-2-3 (2009) (imposing an income tax on residents
and non-residents [with New Mexico source income] at specified rates); N.M. STAT. §§ 7-1-13(B)
(requiring the filing of tax returns and the paying of tax).
165. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 290.92(2a)(1) (2009) (requiring employers to withhold the
Minnesota income tax from the wages of employees and to pay this to the state); N.M. STAT. § 7-33(A) (2009) (requiring employers to withhold the New Mexico income tax from the wages of the
employees and to pay this to the state).
166. I.R.C. § 3402(a) (2006).
167. I.R.C. § 3403 (2006).
168. See I.R.C. § 3406 (2006) (requiring backup withholding if the payee of interest does not
provide the payer with necessary information sufficient to allow information reporting to IRS). The
information reporting requirements for the payment of interest are contained in I.R.C. § 6049
(2006).
169. See I.R.C. § 6049 (2006).
170. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (2006) (defining interest as a form of gross income); Treas. Reg. § 161-7(a).
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owner.171 Now, however, information reporting is required, but the
interest income still remains exempt from the federal income tax.172 For
state income tax purposes, states can require in-state issuers to report the
interest that they pay to bond owners. However, states cannot require
out-of-state issuers of municipal bonds to report interest payments to
them.173 Accordingly, states have no practical way for imposing
withholding and payment of their income taxes on interest paid by other
state and local governments.174
Therefore, for purposes of this article, I will assume that the legal
incidence of the state income tax falls on the owner of the tribal bond
and not on the tribe. As a result, legal incidence, which can be
especially tricky in cases involving sales, use, and excise taxes, is not
such a troublesome issue here because everyone assumes that the legal
incidence of the state income tax falls on the bond owner who receives
the interest income. Legal incidence would be relevant only if one tribe
owned a bond issued by another tribe. In that case, the legal incidence
of the state income tax would fall on the bond-owning tribe. Under the
tribal immunity cases, a state would be unable to impose its income tax
on the interest paid to a tribe within its boundaries. In contrast, a nontribal owner of a tribal bond would not enjoy tribal immunity because
the legal incidence of the state income tax falls on him, her, or it.
IV. INDIAN PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
The broad notion of federal preemption of state law derives from
the Supremacy Clause in the United States Constitution. That clause
provides that:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,

171. Before its amendment by the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-222, §502, 120 Stat. 345, I.R.C. § 6049 (2006) specifically exempted interest on
tax-exempt bonds from the reporting requirements.
172. See I.R.C. § 103(a) (2006).
173. This limitation applies because a state’s jurisdiction and taxing powers over
extraterritorial matters are limited to those people and objects that have a nexus with the particular
state. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1992) (holding that North Dakota
could not require an out-of-state seller to impose and collect the state’s use tax on sales into the state
when the only contact involved mail order sales and no physical presence).
174. See id.
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any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary
notwithstanding.175

The Supremacy Clause is a necessary working rule for deciding
when the federal law displaces or nullifies state law.176 Assuming
Congress has the power under the Constitution to pass a particular
statute, then that federal statute’s effect on state law becomes a frequent
question.
In general, federal preemption is either express or implied.177
Express preemption occurs when the text of a particular federal statute
explicitly displaces state law.178 A good example of such preemption is
the special rule prohibiting state taxation of treaty fishing rights retained
by a federally recognized Indian tribe. This provision states:
Such treaties, and any Executive orders and Acts of Congress under
which the rights of any Indian tribe to fish are secured, shall be
construed to prohibit (in addition to any other prohibition) the
imposition under any law of a State or political subdivision thereof of
any tax on any income derived from the exercise of rights to fish
secured by such treaty, Executive order, or Act of Congress if section
7873 of Title 26 does not permit a like Federal tax to be imposed on
179
such income.

175. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
176. See JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
1831 (Hilliard, Gray & Co., 1833) (stating that if “it was to establish a national government, that
[federal] government ought, to the extent of its powers and rights, to be supreme.”).
177. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (finding that a federal law
preempts a state law when “Congress’ command is explicitly indicated in the statute's language or
implicitly contained in its structure and purpose”).
178. See id.
179. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006). By reference this statute incorporates the federal prohibition
against federal taxation of tribal fishing rights. The federal prohibition states:
Sec. 7873. Income derived by Indians from exercise of fishing rights
(a) In general
(1) Income and self-employment taxes
No tax shall be imposed by subtitle A on income derived-(A) by a member of an Indian tribe directly or through a
qualified Indian entity, or
(B) by a qualified Indian entity,
from a fishing rights-related activity of such tribe.
(2) Employment taxes
No tax shall be imposed by subtitle C on remuneration paid for
services performed in a fishing rights-related activity of an Indian
tribe by a member of such tribe for another member of such tribe or
for a qualified Indian entity.
I.R.C. § 7873 (2006).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010

25

Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 25 [2010], Art. 3

TAYLOR_MACRO.DOC

148

3/15/2010 11:30 AM

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

[25:123

In this statute, we see Congress using broad language that prohibits
state taxation of income derived from the exercise of tribal fishing rights.
When Congress uses such explicit language prohibiting state taxation,
states rarely undertake the effort to tax the activity.180 In most instances,
however, Congress provides no specific rules governing the preemptive
effect of its legislation when such legislation deals with Indian country.
This was the case with the federal income tax treatment of tribal bonds.
Congress provided fairly specific rules on the federal income tax
treatment of tribal bonds181 but provided no explicit prohibition of state
income taxation of interest paid to tribal bond holders.
Consequently, we are dealing with a case of implied preemption.
Implied preemption is more difficult to determine because we have no
explicit language to provide guidance. The federal courts have
developed something of a preemption jurisprudence when preemption is
of the “implied” variety. The two types are field preemption and
conflict preemption.182 Field preemption arises when the federal
regulatory scheme leaves little or no room for state participation.183
Conflict preemption arises when a federal law and a state law lead to
different results.184 With conflict preemption, the assumption is that the

180. See lack of reported cases involving this prohibition under 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006). In
contrast, states frequently assert their power to tax even when the activity is on the reservation and
involves the tribe or a tribal member. See, e.g., Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867)
(county in Kansas attempts to impose property tax on lands owned by Shawnee Indians); Thomas v.
Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898) (Oklahoma Territory attempts to impose a tax on cattle owned by a nonIndian when the cattle were on reservation lands under a lease with the tribe); Warren Trading Post
v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965) (Arizona attempts to impose its sales tax on a
federally licensed Indian trader selling goods and services on the Navajo Nation); McClanahan v.
State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (Arizona attempts to impose its income tax on a
Navajo woman who lives and works on the Navajo Nation); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373
(1976) (Minnesota county attempts to impose a property tax on a tribal member’s mobile home
located on the Leech Lake Reservation); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450
(1995) (Oklahoma attempts to impose various taxes on the Chickasaw Nation and its members);
Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005) (Kansas attempts to impose motor
fuel taxes on gasoline sold at a station owned by the tribe on its reservation).
181. See I.R.C. §§ 7871(c), (e) (2006).
182. See Patricia L. Donze, Legislating Comity: Can Congress Enforce Federalism Constraints
Through Restrictions on Preemption Doctrine?, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 239, 249-50
(2000/2001).
183. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (discussing the general
federal regulation of grain elevators occupied the field and prevented concurrent state regulation).
184. See, e.g., Mich. Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S.
461, 469-70 (1984) (invalidating state statute that conflicted with federal statute regulating
agriculture).
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result flowing from application of the federal law is the one Congress
would prefer.185
Within the context of federal Indian law, the rules of preemption
operate somewhat differently.186
Often referred to as “Indian
preemption,”187 this different approach reflects 1) the continuing
importance of tribal sovereignty188; 2) the presence of a third party (the
tribe) in which there is a special federal interest, as shown in treaties,
executive orders, and substantial federal legislation and regulation189;
and 3) the absence of a seat at the political table for the tribes.190 The
Supreme Court, as is so often the case with its jurisprudence in most
areas of law, has failed to refine Indian preemption into a coherent,
logical whole.191 Instead, Indian preemption may be summarized as a
process in which the Court considers and balances the various tribal,
federal, and state interests.192 As a result, Indian preemption may
adversely affect state law under circumstances when traditional
preemption would not. Therefore, it is important to review Indian
preemption to see when and how the interest-balancing process comes
into play as an overlay to the implied preemption discussed above.
The story of Indian preemption begins with the 1832 case of
Worcester v. Georgia.193 In that case, Justice John Marshall articulated
the proposition that state laws did not extend into Indian country, even if

185. See id.
186. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980):
The unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally unhelpful to apply to
federal enactments regulating Indian tribes those standards of pre-emption that have
emerged in other areas of the law. Tribal reservations are not States, and the differences
in the form and nature of their sovereignty make it treacherous to import to one notions
of pre-emption that are properly applied to the other.
Id.
187. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Formalism and Judicial Supremacy in Federal Indian Law,
32 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 391, 416-20 (2007/2008) (discussing Indian preemption as a separate form
of preemption).
188. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1607 (1963) (stating that “the unique
historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally unhelpful to apply to federal enactments
regulating Indian tribes those standards of pre-emption that have emerged in other areas of the
law.”).
189. See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 173-74 (1973) (emphasizing
the importance of treaties and federal legislation).
190. See Taylor, supra note 126, at 886-90 [Michigan State] (emphasizing how the political
framework of Congress adequately protects state interests but does not protect or incorporate tribal
interests).
191. See Skibine, supra note 187, at 416-20.
192. See id.
193. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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the particular Indian reservation was located solely within a particular
state.194 The Worcester case was one episode in a very complicated
history in which Georgia, aided and abetted by President Jackson, but
not supported by Congress or the Supreme Court, attempted to remove
the Cherokee from their homelands in Georgia to territory that later
became Oklahoma.195 Part of Georgia’s plan to expel the Cherokee to
gain access to their lands, and the gold thought to be there, was a legal
regime that required all white people to acquire a license from Georgia
before entering the Cherokee Nation.196 This legislation attempted to
isolate the Cherokee from Indian traders and Christian missionaries,
many of whom supported the right of the Cherokee to remain on their
lands. Samuel Worcester was a missionary from Vermont197 whose
church received federal funding for its missionary efforts.198 Worcester
undertook missionary activities with federal permission199 but without
obtaining a license under the Georgia statute.200 Worcester’s failure to
secure a license under Georgia law exposed him to criminal liability.201
When he traveled off of the Cherokee Nation onto Georgia soil, he was
arrested, charged, tried, convicted, and imprisoned for violating Georgia
law.202 He appealed his case, which ultimately made its way to the
United States Supreme Court.203 Georgia refused to appear in the
case,204 presumably because it viewed its sovereignty over its own soil
as paramount to the Cherokee Nation’s aboriginal title confirmed by
federal treaties. Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall concluded that
Georgia’s regulations and criminal provisions did not extend into the
territory of the Cherokee Nation even though its territory was
geographically within the boundaries of Georgia.205 Reduced to its
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See id. at 561.
See ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 106-07 (1970).
See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 539-40.
See id. at 538.
See JAMES W. FRASER, BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE: RELIGION AND PUBLIC
EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL AMERICA 89-92 (1999) (describing federal funding of mission
schools on reservations beginning in 1819).
199. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 538 (1832).
200. See id. at 537.
201. See id. at 536.
202. See id. at 540.
203. See id. at 536.
204. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 535 (1832) (listing no counsel for Georgia
and providing no summary of Georgia’s legal position).
205. See id. at 561 (“The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves
or in conformity with treaties and with acts of Congress.”).
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simplest formulation, the Worcester case essentially held that the
presence of a federal-tribal relationship between the United States and
the Cherokee Nation, as reflected in treaties and federal legislation,
excluded the application of state law.206 The key point is that the treaties
and federal legislation never stated that Georgia law had no application
within the Cherokee Nation. Instead, Justice Marshall inferred that the
federal presence left no room for Georgia to exert its legislative power.
In kernel form, then, the Worcester case expressed an early form of field
preemption.
Reality, however, departed from the rule of law. Even though the
Supreme Court’s decision in Worcester nullified the state court
conviction, Georgia ignored the Court’s ruling and refused to release
Samuel Worcester from prison.207 President Jackson was standing for
reelection and needed Georgia’s votes in the Electoral College.208 In
addition, President Jackson had already endorsed a removal policy for
the Cherokee Nation and other tribes.209 Accordingly, he was unwilling
to use federal force to free Samuel Worcester from the Georgia prison.210
Facing a long imprisonment, Samuel Worcester accepted Georgia’s offer
to release him from prison if he left Georgia. He abandoned his
missionary work on the Cherokee Nation in Georgia and moved to the
Indian Territory (later Oklahoma) to continue his missionary work with
the Cherokee.211 Ultimately, the Jackson administration negotiated a
treaty with the Cherokee Nation in which the tribe agreed to removal to
Oklahoma.212 This treaty, however, was a fraud.213 The treaty-making
process between the United States and the Cherokee Nation followed the
treaty-making formalities but did not include a valid expression of
consent from the leaders of the Cherokee Nation.214 Ultimately, Georgia
succeeded in its efforts at ethnic cleansing. The actual removal of the
Cherokee was a brutal process in which thousands of Cherokee perished
206. See id. (“The act of the State of Georgia under which the plaintiff in error was prosecuted
is consequently void, and the judgment a nullity.”).
207. See DEBO, supra note 195, at 105-06.
208. See id.
209. See T. HARRY WILLIAMS ET AL., A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES TO 1876, at 370
(1959) (explaining the support that Jackson received from southern states by pursuing a removal
policy for Native Americans).
210. See DEBO, supra note 195, at 105-06.
211. See ALTHEA BASS, CHEROKEE MESSENGER 5 (1996).
212. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL
ANOMALY 168-82 (1994) (describing Jackson-era treaties).
213. See BASS, supra note 211, at 5 (describing how a small group of Cherokee formed the
Treaty Party with whom the United States negotiated an illegal treaty).
214. Id.
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along the now infamous Trail of Tears.215 Notwithstanding these tragic
historical events, the Worcester case remains an important precedent
establishing the basic principles of federal preemption.
For our purposes, we can skip forward to 1959 when the United
States Supreme Court decided Williams v. Lee.216 This case involved the
question of state court jurisdiction over a suit by an Indian trader, Hugh
Lee, who sued to collect on a debt incurred by Navajo customers, Paul
and Lorena Williams, for the sale of goods.217 The underlying
transaction took place entirely on the Navajo Nation.218 Even though he
could have sued in a Navajo court, Lee sued in the Arizona state court.219
Relying on Worcester v. Georgia,220 the Court concluded that state
jurisdiction over the lawsuit would infringe the right of the Navajo
Nation to govern itself.221 In the absence of an express authorization
from Congress, states, with limited exceptions, have no power over
tribes.222 The William v. Lee case stands for the broad proposition that
state law, unless authorized by Congress, cannot infringe tribal
sovereignty.
Together, Worcester and Williams stand for the proposition that
state laws stop at the reservation boundary. For state laws to cross this
boundary, Congress must authorize states to exercise judicial and
legislative power within Indian country. The rationale that we extract
from Williams is that the federal-tribal relationship is intended to protect
tribal sovereignty, including possible infringement by the states.
The next important decision is Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax
Commission.223
This case is the primary precedent for federal
preemption. In Warren Trading Post, the United States Supreme Court
found that treaties, federal legislation, and federal regulations preempted
state taxation of licensed Indian traders.224 No text in these sources of
the law specifically mentioned state taxation. Instead, the Court found
that the federal presence was so pervasive that it left no room for state
taxation.225 This case, then, is a form of simple field preemption.

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

See DEBO, supra note 195, at 106-07.
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
Id. at 217.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 218-19 (discussing the application of Worcester v. Georgia).
See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
See id.
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
See id. at 691-92.
See id. at 691.
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The infringement concerns expressed in Williams and the field
preemption found in Warren Trading Post come together in White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker.226 Bracker involved state taxation
of non-Indian contractors who hauled harvested timber for the tribe.227
The Court concluded that infringement and preemption were
independent barriers to state taxation.228 In addition, the Court found
that infringement was an important backdrop in determining whether
ambiguous federal legislation actually preempted the state power to
tax.229 Finally, the Court considered and weighed the tribal, state, and
federal interests.230 The Court found that the attempts of a state to tax
non-Indians required a “particularized inquiry into the nature of the
state, federal, and tribal interests at stake.”231
The Indian preemption doctrine as applied in three subsequent
cases is worthy of our attention. The first case is Cotton Petroleum
Corp. v. New Mexico,232 a case in which the Court upheld state taxation
of oil production on Indian lands by a non-Indian oil company.233 For
our purposes here, the key point in Cotton Petroleum is that Congress
can authorize state taxation of non-Indians just as it can, explicitly or
through implied preemption, bar state taxation. In Cotton Petroleum, the
Court found that early federal legislation had authorized state taxation,
and that subsequent federal legislation did not change this
authorization.234 The Court also explained that, in the absence of federal
preemption, states generally can tax non-Indians for their activities
within Indian country.235 Finally, the Court acknowledged, as part of its
preemption analysis, that state taxation can infringe tribal sovereignty
and can, therefore, be barred by the infringement test.236 The Court,
however, found that there was no evidence that the state tax actually
infringed tribal sovereignty.237

226. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
227. See id. at 139.
228. See id. at 143 (“The two barriers [infringement and preemption] are independent because
either, standing alone, can be a sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable to activity
undertaken on the reservation or by tribal members.”).
229. See id.
230. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980).
231. Id. at 145.
232. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
233. See id. at 186-87.
234. See id. at 182.
235. See id. at 173-76.
236. See id. at 186-87.
237. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 187 (1989).
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In the case of Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blaze
Construction Co., the reach of federal preemption was narrowed.238 In
Blaze, a road construction company entered into road building contracts
with the federal government.239 All the building took place on Indian
Blaze Construction
reservations within the state of Arizona.240
Company, the road builder, asserted that various federal statutes
preempted Arizona’s taxation of the construction activity.241 The Court,
however, held that the company was doing business with the United
States, not the Indian tribes.242 As a result, the Court found that the
federal statutes did not apply to the company and did not preempt state
taxation. Likewise, in the case of Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi
Nation,243 the Court undertook a very technical consideration of the
preemption cases and concluded that state taxation whose legal
incidence is physically located off the reservation does require
application of the Indian preemption doctrine.244
Together, these cases recognize an Indian preemption doctrine in
which the tribal, state, and federal interests must be considered in light
of the normal preemption rules. Given these cases, the primary question
is whether Indian preemption even applies in the context of state income
taxation of interest paid on tribal bonds. An application of Justice
Thomas’ approach in Wagnon could lead to the conclusion that the state
income tax on the tribal bond interest is a non-discriminatory state tax
that applies to a non-Indian on a transaction that takes place outside of
Indian country. In Wagnon, Justice Thomas emphasized the “who” and
the “where.”245 He concluded that a non-Indian was the person subject
to a state tax on a transaction taking place off the reservation.246 These
circumstances, he concluded, took the transaction and the related state
taxation outside the scope of the Indian preemption doctrine.247 To place
this analysis in its proper context, we need to recall that the tax in
Wagnon was a Kansas fuel excise tax imposed on a non-Indian fuel
wholesaler taking delivery of the fuel off the reservation. The tribe
bought the gasoline from the wholesaler who then delivered it on the

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 526 U.S. 32 (1999).
See id. at 34.
See id.
See id. at 37.
See id.
Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
See id. at 101-02.
See id. at 101.
See id. at 102.
See id. at 101-02.
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reservation to the tribe and included the Kansas fuel excise tax in the
price.248 The tribe then sold the gasoline on its reservation mostly to
motorists who were on their way to or from the tribe’s nearby casino.249
Even though the tribe sold the gas at its own gas station located on the
reservation, the tribe was not the taxpayer, and the time and place of
taxation was not the tribe’s retail sale of gasoline to the final
consumer.250 According to Justice Thomas, the Indian preemption
doctrine did not apply and a consideration of the tribal, federal, and state
interests was, therefore, unnecessary.251
Justice Thomas acknowledged that Kansas in the Wagnon case had
changed its law so that its legal incidence would shift away from the
tribe and onto non-Indian wholesalers whose taxable conduct would take
place outside of Indian country.252 Justice Ginsburg, in her opinion in
Chickasaw Nation ten years earlier, had observed that states could get
around tribal immunity from state taxation by changing the legal
incidence of their taxes.253 She did not, however, indicate if this change
would necessarily eliminate the need to undertake a preemption analysis.
Instead, she conceded that state taxation of tribal interests located off the
reservation could be preempted.254
In contrast, application of Justice Thurgood Marshall’s approach in
Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission255 would
definitely lead to an opposite conclusion. In Central Machinery, Justice
Marshall looked at the circumstances and events that made up a
transaction involving the sale of farm machinery to the tribe.256 Some of
the transaction took place off the reservation, and part took place on the

248. See Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 99-100 (2005).
249. See id. at 99.
250. See id. at 102-03.
251. See id. at 110 (concluding that the Bracker preemption test should not apply when the tax
is imposed on a non-Indian outside of the reservation).
252. See id. at 105. See also Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 379 F.3d 979, 982
(10th Cir. 2004) (indicating that Kansas amended its fuel excise tax statute so that the legal
incidence would shift in a way so that it could tax on-reservation sales of gasoline).
253. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 460 (1995) (noting that “if a
State is unable to enforce a tax because the legal incidence of the impost is on Indians or Indian
tribes, the State generally is free to amend its law to shift the tax’s legal incidence.”).
254. See id. at 465 (evaluating whether a treaty between the United States and the Chickasaw
Nation preempted the Oklahoma income tax on tribal members working for the Nation but living off
its reservation).
255. See Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
256. See id. at 161.
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reservation.257 All things considered, Justice Marshall concluded that
the primary focus of the transaction was on the reservation.258
As I noted earlier in the discussion about state taxation in Indian
country, the location of the taxable activity as taking place on or off the
reservation is a key consideration. Indeed, the results in Central
Machinery, Mescalero Apache, and Wagnon hinged on the location of
the activity. Implicit in the Court’s analysis is a rather crude notion of
boundaries and territoriality that harkens back to reservation policies
designed to dispossess, dominate, pacify, and isolate Native Americans
within confined areas called reservation, but which, to be honest, often
constituted nineteenth century internment camps. Since 1934, federal
policy, with some important lapses, has focused on supporting Indian
tribes as political entities retaining some degree of aboriginal
sovereignty used to govern their communities and to exercise selfdetermination.259 The legal260 and physical forms261 of tribes vary
tremendously as do their territorial manifestations.262 Consequently, it
seems rather odd that the Supreme Court should draw a line in the sand
that corresponds directly with the reservation boundary, especially when
most aspects of daily life in the United States regularly cross political
boundaries of reservation, city, town, county, state, and country.
All the circumstances that make up a single tribal bond transaction
are likely to cross all or most of these boundaries. To decide, then, that
the state income taxation of the interest that the tribe pays to the bond
owner is of no political, jurisdictional, or financial interest to the tribe
seems ridiculous. Yet the approach of Justice Thomas in Wagnon is
likely to lead to that result because he probably would view the bond
owner’s receipt of the interest income and off-reservation residence as
sufficient to eliminate any tribal interest. However, the focus of the
tribal bond transaction is the financing of a project on the reservation
257. See id.
258. See id. at 164-65 (focusing on the place where the contract for sale was executed and how
the tribe took delivery).
259. See Taylor, supra note 126, at 948.
260. See Christine Zuni Cruz, Tribal Law as Indigenous Social Reality and Separate
Consciousness: [Re]Incorporating Customs and Traditions into Tribal Law, 1 N.M. TRIBAL L.J.
(2000/2001), available at http://tlj.unm.edu/tribal-law-journal/articles/volume_1/zuni_cruz/
index.php (discussing variations in tribal legal systems that include traditional, hybrid, and modern
American).
261. See L. Scott Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro v. Reina: Compromising
Sovereignty and the Constitution, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 53, 122-49 (1994) (describing varying land
ownership and demographic patterns on various reservations).
262. See PRUCHA, supra note 33, at 37-42 (1990) (containing maps showing Indian reservations
from 1887 to 1987).
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that furthers an essential governmental function263 of the tribe. Indeed,
the tribal bond’s tax-exempt status for federal income tax purposes
requires that the bond proceeds be used to further an essential
governmental function of the tribe.264 The transaction itself and the
federal income tax treatment that follows show important tribal and
federal interests.
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s approach in Central Machinery, even
though it proceeded from the assumption that the transaction in question
must be located within the tribe’s reservation, was more nuanced than
Justice Thomas’ approach in Wagnon. Justice Marshall considered the
focus of the Central Machinery transaction in the context of a strong
federal interest and a concern for the sovereignty of the tribe.265 Justice
Thomas, in contrast, first located the taxable event off the reservation
and then concluded that balancing the respective state, federal, and tribal
interests was unnecessary.266
Justice Marshall, nonetheless, still
conceded that the transaction must be “on” the reservation for the
preemption analysis to apply.267 And at this point he focused on facts
showing that the place of executing the contract, the place of taking
possession, and the place of payment were all on the reservation.268 Are
these really important factors, given that imposition of the Arizona’s
sales tax will be a financial burden on the tribe purchasing the farm
machinery? Is form of payment really that important? Should the
preemption of the state tax hinge on whether the payment was handdelivered off the reservation, took place physically on the reservation, or
occurred by sending a check through the mail?
So although Justice Marshall’s approach shows more flexibility
than the approach of Justice Thomas, both approaches focus on fairly
meaningless factors. In this sense, both seem to be conceding that
matters of state taxation in Indian country are rather arbitrary and often
allow meaningless factors of form ultimately to decide the outcome. I
am a law professor who teaches federal income tax and must confess
that federal tax law as written, applied, and interpreted often exalts form
over substance. Form is important in the federal tax system as a way of
promoting clarity and predictability. Nonetheless, substance can and

263. See I.R.C. §§ 7871(c)(1), (e) (2006) (requiring the proceeds of tribal bonds to be used in
the exercise of essential governmental functions).
264. See id.
265. See Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160, 163-64 (1980).
266. See Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 110 (2005).
267. See Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 165.
268. See id. at 164-65.
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does apply in many circumstances to control questions of taxability in
the federal system.269
In contrast, the primary purpose of the Indian preemption doctrine
is, in the absence of explicit federal guidance, to consider important and
competing tribal, federal, and state interests. Consequently, substance
should be the overriding concern. It is fair to say that Justice Thomas’s
approach in Wagnon exalted form over substance and prevented the
Court from considering how the tribe’s gas station and the imposition of
the state fuel excise tax played out when tied to the tribal, federal, and
state interests.
The categorical “where” in the analysis ought to be abandoned,
because it focuses too much on form and too little on the substance of
the actual taxes. Instead, the Court, in deciding whether to apply Indian
preemption, should look at the presence of federal and tribal interests.
The most important evidence of a federal interest will be federal
legislation. There should be some connection between the federal
legislation and the subject matter of the attempted state taxation. The
tribal interest will manifest itself most by looking at how the state
taxation imposes a financial burden on the tribe and impedes the tribe in
its operation as a government. At this point, the “where” question,
instead of being one that concludes that the transaction is either “on” or
“off” the reservation, should look at the overall transaction and its
connection to the tribal, federal, and state interests. Here the transaction
can be linked to its function to assist in determining the relative weight
to be given to each of the interests.
The “who” question is connected to legal incidence. As I
previously discussed, legal incidence means little more than a tax statute
naming the taxpayer. In the context of state income taxation of interest
on tribal bonds, the legal incidence will fall on the bond owner who most
likely will be a person who is not a tribe or a member of a tribe. To bar
state income taxation at this point, Indian preemption must come into
play. The “who” question, as a result, is unimportant. This takes us
back to the “where” question.
Assuming, then, that the interest balancing process should begin,
how do the interests fare? It is appropriate to start with the tribal interest
because it is the tribe that must carry the financial burden of increased
borrowing costs if states are allowed to impose their state income tax on
269. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (finding that a purported
reorganization that met all statutory requirements was, nonetheless, not a reorganization because it
lacked substance); Rev. Rul. 2002-69, 2002-2 C.B. 760 (stating categorically that the “substance of
a transaction, not its form, governs its tax treatment.”).
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tribal bond interest income. Tribal bond financing of the kind we are
discussing involves the funding of projects that further essential
governmental functions of the tribe. These projects involve water,
sewer, roads, governmental buildings, governmental services, education,
health, and other essential functions of government. In general, tribal
members living on reservations are among the poorest Americans often
lacking the barest necessities of life.270 Given these social ills, Congress
probably believed that tribal bonds, like state and local ones, should
enjoy the same exempt status for federal income tax purposes as a way
of lessening the cost of borrowing. Because of the great economic needs
of tribes and their members, exemption from state income taxation is all
the more important. Congress recognized the need to lessen the cost of
tribal borrowing. Therefore, state income taxation of tribal bond interest
contradicts the federal purpose of lowering the borrowing costs of tribes.
More generally, a core interest of all governments is tax revenue.
Without revenue, a government cannot function. Most states raise most
of their revenue through taxation. A state’s power to tax, then, is one of
its most important governmental powers. Accordingly, Congress and
federal courts need to consider any constraints on a state’s taxing power
quite carefully. In this article, I assume that Congress has the power to
preempt a state’s taxing power if necessary to promote and regulate
Indian affairs. Thus, when the tribal interest is strong and where federal
legislation promotes that tribal interest, then the state taxing power
should yield. Within a federal system, this result may seem too harsh on
the states. However, this is not the case. The states are not irretrievably
harmed because Congress, having enacted legislation suggesting that
Indian preemption is appropriate, has the power to enact legislation
authorizing state taxation.
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act271 (IGRA) is a good example of
how Congress can respond to situations where the Court interprets
federal legislation and its preemptive effect in a way that benefits tribes.
Congress passed IGRA in 1988 because the United States Supreme
Court had ruled in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians that
the tribe could operate a high stakes bingo facility on its reservation,

270. US Census data from 2006 showed Native Americans as having the highest poverty rate at
over 25 percent, which is twice the national average. See US Census Bureau, Press Release: Income
Climbs, Poverty Stabilizes, Uninsured Rate Increases, CB 06-136 (Aug. 29, 2006), available at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/income_wealth/007419.html.
271. See Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§
2701-2721 (2006)).
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even though California law made those kinds of bingo games illegal.272
The Court’s decision, in an opinion by Justice White, found substantial
legal ambiguity on the question of the application of California law
within Indian country.273 Ultimately, the Court found in favor of the
tribal interest, upholding the legality of the tribe’s bingo operation.274
As a group, states were concerned about the uncontrolled expansion
of Indian gaming after the Cabazon decision.275 Congress responded
with IGRA, which gave states a say in Indian gaming and required good
faith negotiations between states and tribes.276 Casino-style gaming in
most states required the negotiation of a compact between the state and
the specific tribe.277 IGRA gave most of the regulatory authority to the
tribes but provided substantial oversight through the National Indian
Gaming Commission, a federal agency.278 IGRA shows that states have
the political wherewithal within our constitutional democracy to marshal
forces to secure federal legislation if and when they are unhappy with a
judicial decision of the Supreme Court. In contrast, tribes do not have
political representation in Congress.279
Accordingly, the existing federal statutes governing tribal bonds,
when considered in light of the competing interests of tribes, states, and
the federal government, should preempt state income taxes. If states are
unhappy with a judicial decision that confirms this result, then they have
ready access to Congress and can argue for remedial legislation as they
did after the Court decided the Cabazon case.
V. INFRINGEMENT OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
When Indian preemption is involved, state infringement of tribal
sovereignty is a factor that the courts consider as part of the process of
weighing tribal, federal, and state interests.280 Infringement became part

272. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1987), superseded
by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1166 (2006), (stating that unregulated bingo is a misdemeanor under CAL.
PEN. CODE ANN. 326.5 (West Supp. 1987)).
273. See id. at 209-11.
274. See id. at 222.
275. See KATHRYN R. L. RAND AND STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT, INDIAN GAMING LAW AND
POLICY 29-33 (2006) (providing a brief overview of the political responses to Indian gaming after
the decision in Cabazon).
276. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (2006).
277. See id.
278. See id. at § 2704-09.
279. See Taylor, supra note 126, at 885-87 (describing the lack of political representation that
tribes have in Congress).
280. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980).
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of the preemption analysis in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Commission,281 when Justice Thurgood Marshall explained that state
infringement of tribal sovereignty should be a contextual backdrop
within which the preemption analysis takes place.282 After McClanahan,
it was not entirely clear whether state infringement of tribal sovereignty
could be an independent basis for blocking a state action that affected a
tribe, its members, or an activity taking place within a tribe’s reservation
boundaries.283
State infringement of tribal sovereignty, at least as a theoretical
matter, does remain a separate and independent bar to the exercise of
state authority within Indian country.284 The United States Supreme
Court made this quite clear in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw
Nation.285 In that case, the Chickasaw Nation contended that language
in one of its treaties, which operated as federal law under the Supremacy
Clause of the federal Constitution, preempted Oklahoma’s state income
tax on tribal members who worked for the tribe but who lived off the
reservation in Oklahoma.286 Justice Ginsburg interpreted the text of the
particular treaty as having no preemptive effect287 and, therefore, was
unwilling to bar the imposition of the state income tax in the absence of
federal legislation that could be read as providing some form of implied
preemption under the Indian preemption doctrine.288 Of critical
importance for purposes of the present discussion, Justice Ginsburg
noted that the state income tax could be barred by application of the
infringement test.289 Her opinion, however, indicated that the issue was
not raised below or in the case before the Supreme Court.290 As a result,
consideration of infringement in the Chickasaw Nation case would have
been improper.291

281. McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
282. See id. at 172.
283. See Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142 (indicating that infringement is a test separate from
preemption).
284. See id.
285. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995).
286. See id. at 465.
287. See id. at 466 (“We do not read the Treaty as conferring super-sovereign authority to
interfere with another jurisdiction's sovereign right to tax income, from all sources, of those who
choose to live within that jurisdiction's limits.”).
288. See id. at 465 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973),
which stated that Indians going beyond their own boundaries subject themselves to state taxation in
the absence of federal law preempting that taxation).
289. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 464 (1995).
290. See id.
291. See id. at n.14.
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So when does infringement come into play? When does the
exercise of state authority so infringe a tribe’s right to self-government
that the state action is rendered invalid? From the decided cases, I
conclude that impermissible infringement almost never provides a basis
for invalidating the exercise of state authority affecting a tribe. The
infringement test is often not asserted because the Indian preemption
doctrine provides a sufficient basis for evaluating the propriety of a state
exercising its authority. In part, this explains why few cases actually ask
and answer the infringement question.
In this article, I assert that the infringement test has been operating
as an unarticulated prong of judicial analysis in dealing with direct state
taxation of tribes and their members when engaged in on-reservation
activity. It is important to recall that federal case law uniformly holds
that direct state taxation of a tribe or its members for activity within
Indian country is categorically barred.292 The only additional refinement
of this principle is legal incidence.293 So, if we assume that the legal
incidence of a tax falls on a tribe or one of its members for activity on
the reservation, then the state tax is invalid. The Supreme Court, even
though it has recognized this principle in numerous cases, has never
provided a rationale for this categorical tribal immunity from state
taxation. The Court’s unstated rationale must be infringement. The
Court is recognizing that state taxation of a tribe or its members for
activity undertaken within Indian country would infringe the tribe’s
sovereignty and prevent it from or impede it in enacting and enforcing
its own laws.
We can locate infringement analysis as a subtext of tribal immunity
from state taxation in a line of cases starting with the Kansas Indians

292. See id. at 458 (concluding that a state cannot tax tribes or their members for onreservation activity unless authorized by Congress); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes &
Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 258 (1992) (finding that states have no power to tax
reservations lands); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (holding that Itasca County in
Minnesota could not impose its property tax on a tribal member’s mobile home located on the
reservation); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463,
475-81 (1976) (prohibiting the imposition of Montana’s cigarette excise tax on sales by onreservation smoke shops to tribal members); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S.
164, 165-66 (1973) (ruling that Arizona could not impose its income tax on the wages earned by a
member of the Navajo Nation who lived and worked on the reservation); New York Indians, 72
U.S. (5 Wall.) 761, 764 (1866) (finding tribal lands immune from New York property taxes until the
rights of possession of the tribe have been extinguished through a lawful treaty); Kansas Indians, 72
U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 757 (1866) (holding that a Kansas county could not impose its property tax on
property owned by a Shawnee tribal member owning the property under an allotment provided by
treaty).
293. See Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 458-62.
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and ending with Wagnon. In the Kansas Indians case, the Court stated
that as “long as the United States recognizes [the tribe’s] national
character . . . their property is withdrawn from” the state’s power to
tax.294 The Court’s focus on the tribe’s national character undoubtedly
recognizes the principle that tribes are self-governing political
communities. The Court uses similar language in The New York Indians
case showing the recognition of political separation.295 The concern
about a tribe’s sovereignty becomes explicit in McClanahan:
The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it
provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but because it
provides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal
statutes must be read. It must always be remembered that the various
Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign nations, and that
their claim to sovereignty long predates that of our own
Government.296

This quote from McClanahan shows that the starting and ending
point is the tribe’s aboriginal sovereignty: its right to exist as a political
community governed, as much as possible, by laws of its own making.
The Wagnon Court, even though it refused to apply the Bracker
balancing test,297 nonetheless conceded that in different circumstances
the tribal interest would have to be considered, even if the legal
incidence of the tax did not fall on the tribe or a tribal member.298
Unfortunately, state income taxation of interest paid to bond
owners of tribal bonds is not a tax whose legal incidence falls on the
tribe. Therefore, the line of cases just discussed does not provide clear
precedent supporting a bar against state income taxation. Such a
categorical bar would arise if the owner of a tribal bond was another
tribe. In such a case, the legal incidence of the state income tax falls on
the tribe and most courts probably would conclude that most of the
transaction takes place within Indian country. For purposes of this
article, I am assuming that the tribal bond owner is a non-Indian living in
a state with an income tax that applies to interest income on bonds.
294. Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 757.
295. See New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 764 (recognizing the tribe’s “original rights”
and entitlement to “undisturbed enjoyment” of their lands).
296. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172-73.
297. Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 99 (2005). The Bracker
balancing test derives from the case of White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136
(1980). In Bracker the Court entered into a “particularized inquiry into the nature of the state,
federal, and tribal interests at stake” to determine whether a state tax imposed on a non-Indian for
activity within the White Mountain Apache reservation was subject to state taxation. See id. at 145.
298. See Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 102.
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But if we unpack the infringement subtext from the tribal tax
immunity cases, then we see that the United States Supreme Court does
have some concern about the exercise of state power affecting the
operation of tribal government. The Court seems to be assuming that
Chief Justice John Marshall was correct that the power to tax is the
power to destroy.299 Accordingly, tribes deserve protection from the
state’s taxing power, and the United States Supreme Court, in the
absence of any treaty language or federal statute, has been willing to
provide this protection.300 If states could tax tribes, then they could
destroy them. For example, state property taxation would likely
bankrupt many tribes with sizable reservations and would impose, in
many cases, an impossible financial burden on many of their members.
Noting this judicial concern for protecting tribal governments in the
making and administration of their laws, we can now look at the process
of tribal borrowing and its connection with the operation of their
governments. Perhaps looking first at federal and state borrowing will
place the matter in a proper perspective. The federal and state
governments could not operate without the power to borrow money.301
In early 2009, the national debt of the United States stood at more than
$10.7 trillion.302 This represents about 75 percent of the country’s gross
domestic product for 2008303 and about 428 percent of total tax revenues
for the fiscal year 2008.304 If and when Congress fails to increase the
ceiling on the national debt, then federal government shutdowns become
a real possibility. The total debt of the states was estimated to be $2.2

299. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 431 (1819).
300. See, e.g., supra notes 297-98 and text.
301. It is no coincidence that the grant in the Constitution of the power to tax is followed by the
power to “borrow money on the credit of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
302. See Treasury Direct, The Debt to the Penny and Who Holds It,
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/BPDLogin?application=np.
303. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, News release: Gross
Domestic Product: Fourth Quarter 2008 (Advance), BEA 09-02, at table 3,
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2009/txt/gdp408a.txt (giving an advance current
dollar GDP figure of $14.3 trillion). With a February 2009 national debt of $10.7 trillion and a 2008
current dollar GDP of $14.3 trillion, the national debt as a percentage of GDP calculates out at 75
percent (10.7 divided by 14.3 = 74.8 percent).
304. Congressional Budget Office, Historical Tables: Revenue, Outlays, Surpluses, Deficits,
and Debt Held by the Public, 1969-2008 (2009), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9957/
Historicaltables09-web.XLS (showing total 2008 federal revenues of $2.5 trillion). With a February
2009 national debt of $10.7 trillion and total 2008 federal revenues of $2.5 trillion, the national debt
is 428 percent of total federal revenues (10.7 divided by 2.5 = 428 percent).
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trillion as of 2005-06.305 Many state and local governments view their
power to borrow money to be an indispensable tool in accomplishing
core governmental functions.306
Governments as borrowers must pay interest on the money they
borrow. The interest that the lender earns as the owner of a federal or
state bond is income.307 But the federal and state governments quickly
learned that lenders would accept lower rates of interest if the bond
interest was exempt from income tax.308 The practice of the federal
government is quite interesting. Congress has long provided that interest
earned by lenders to the federal government is exempt from state income
tax.309 Congress has not provided an exemption for federal income tax
purposes primarily because higher interest income paid just comes back
to the federal government through higher income tax revenues.310
State governments have insisted on exemption from the federal
income tax from the very beginning.311 The potential federal income
taxation of municipal bond interest became a sticking point in the
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.312 Congress has never seriously considered repealing this

305. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, State & Local Government
Finances by Level of Government and by State: 2005-06, http://www.census.gov/govs/
estimate/0600ussl_1.html (July 1, 2008).
306. See, e.g., Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of State Treasurers as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 11, Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008) (No. 06-666), 2007 WL
2088645. In this brief, the National Association of State Treasurers asserted:
The authority of States to borrow money, like the authority to raise revenues through
taxation, is a core aspect of State sovereignty. State and local governments must have
access to capital markets in order to carry out their essential function of protecting and
promoting the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. By issuing municipal bonds,
States and their political subdivisions are able to raise funds for costly projects that
benefit State citizens over extended periods of time without having to depend entirely on
tax revenues. In the absence of municipal bonds, many important State and local
government initiatives would have to be delayed or cancelled.
Id.
307. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (2006).
308. See supra notes 1-6 and text.
309. See 31 U.S.C. § 3124 (2006) (providing that interest on federal obligations is exempt from
state taxation). This provision originates from the time of the Civil War. See Act of Feb. 25, 1862,
12 Stat. 345, 346, ch. 33, § 2 (prohibiting state taxation of “federal stocks, bonds, and other
securities”).
310. In the case of U.S. Savings Bonds, the interest income is deferred, not exempt. See I.R.C.
454(a) (2006).
311. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 756, 758, ch. 463, § 4.
312. See Arthur A. Ekrirch, Jr., The Sixteenth Amendment: The Historical Background, 1 CATO
JOURNAL 161, 175-76 (1981) (describing the opposition of Charles Evans Hughes, then Governor of
New York, to the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, on the grounds that the federal income
tax would impair the borrowing capacity of states and local government and also describing New
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exemption, although it has allowed limited federal income taxation of
private activity bonds313 through the federal alternative minimum tax.314
State governments, in order to encourage investment in their bonds, have
long denied state income tax exemption for out-of-state municipal
bonds.315 And, as already noted, this practice in Kentucky led two
Kentucky taxpayers to challenge the practice on grounds that
discriminatory state income taxation violated the Dormant Commerce
Clause.316 In the Davis case, the Supreme Court, relying on the
importance borrowing plays for the operation of government, allowed
Kentucky’s discriminatory practice of taxing out-of-state bonds and
exempting in-state bonds.317 Interestingly, the Court did not focus on the
importance of Kentucky’s taxing power as applied to interest on out-ofstate bonds precisely because the intent of the Kentucky tax law was to
encourage Kentucky residents to purchase in-state bonds.318 In addition,
sister states supported Kentucky’s position.319 And finally, although not
noted by the Court, Congress has not enacted any federal legislation
dealing with this wide-spread tax discrimination practiced by 41
states.320
Given the importance of borrowing to most governments, including
tribal governments, it is safe to conclude that tribal borrowing of money
is a core governmental function. State taxation of interest on tribal
bonds increases the cost of tribal borrowing. Every dollar of state
income tax collected on tribal bond interest increases the cost of
borrowing for the tribe by about $1.321 The fiscal effect of this cost
flows directly to governmental operation because the government
issuing the bond must pay this higher interest rate. The federal law
providing the federal exemption requires that the proceeds of tribal
bonds be used only for the performance of an “essential governmental

York’s initial rejection of the amendment); STEVEN R. WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS: LINCOLN
TO WILSON—THE FIERCE BATTLES OVER MONEY AND POWER THAT TRANSFORMED THE NATION
256-59 (2002) (describing how the opposition of Charles Evans Hughes in 1910 made ultimate
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment doubtful).
313. For the definition of private activity bonds, see I.R.C. § 141(a) (2006).
314. See I.R.C. § 57(a)(5) (2006).
315. See Dep’t. of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1805-06 (2008).
316. See id. at 1807.
317. See id. at 1810.
318. See id. at 1826-27 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
319. See id. at 1807 n.7.
320. See Dep’t. of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1807 n.7 (2008).
321. See Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 148 (explaining how the tax exemption operates as a
subsidy; contrariwise, the absence of a subsidy increases the rate of interest and a tribe’s cost of
borrowing).
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function.”322 As a matter of federal law, the tribal bond transaction, by
definition, connects to the performance of core governmental functions.
Given the federal and state context in which governmental
borrowing is a core function and the federal law restricting spending of
tribal bond proceeds to essential governmental functions, it becomes
clear that state income taxation of tribal bond interest infringes a tribe’s
right to self-government. In this sense, then, direct state taxation of a
tribe, which the Supreme Court has found to be categorically improper,
is really no different, as a matter of substance, from direct state taxation
of tribal borrowing. Outside of the tribal context, state and federal
taxation of governmental borrowing reveals the political reality that
income taxation of bond interest directly affects the cost of borrowing.
Accordingly, Congress provides a federal income tax exemption for
interest on municipal bonds323 and imposes a federal prohibition against
state income taxation of interest on federal borrowing.324 The
federal/state dynamic has reached a point of political accommodation
precisely because the structure of Congress as a democratic institution
includes representation of the political interests of states.325 As I already
discussed in the preceding section, if federal law provides no ready or
obvious answer to a question involving the limits of state authority
within Indian country, then it is appropriate for a federal court to adopt a
judicial approach that decides the case in favor of the tribal interest.326 If
the decision is a mistake or stimulates a federal legislative response, then
the states are in a position to look after their own interests in Congress.
Tribes, on the other hand, have no institutional place at the political
table. Fortunately, the process of most federal legislation includes
congressional hearings at which tribal representatives can express their
views. Of course, they often lack the political power to carry them out.
But when their views have the weight of fairness and reason behind
them, the final federal legislation may incorporate these views.327
In summary, judicial protection of tribal sovereignty and selfgovernment through a robust infringement doctrine accommodates the
often conflicting tribal, state, and federal interests. Tribes should receive
the highest level of judicial protection because the historical forces of
322. See I.R.C. § 7871(c)(1) (2006).
323. See I.R.C. § 103(a) (2006).
324. See 31 U.S.C. § 3124 (2006).
325. See Taylor, supra note 126, at 885-90 (discussing how the constitutional and political
structures further the representation of states’ interests in Congress but not those of tribes).
326. See discussion supra accompanying notes 175-279.
327. See Taylor, supra note 126, at 888-89 (discussing this process in the context of Congress’
enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act).
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dispossession have left them with no institutional voice within our
constitutional framework.
States, in contrast, have political
representation in Congress through the Senate. In addition, most
members of the House of Representatives come from backgrounds in
which they served as elected or appointed positions at the state or local
level.328 Quite starkly, no former governmental official from a federally
recognized Indian tribe serves in Congress.329 Finally, Congress has
plenary power over Indian affairs and is, therefore, well situated to
adjust, modify, reverse, or confirm judicial actions that use the
infringement doctrine to protect tribes from the exercise of state and
local governmental powers.330
In the case of tribal bonds, state taxation of the interest income
extracts close to a dollar for dollar cost to the tribes. The United States
Supreme Court in Davis has confirmed that the borrowing function of a
state or local government is so crucial and important that discriminatory
state taxation of out-of-state bonds does not violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause.331 So why should we permit state income taxation of
out-of-state bonds, but not permit state income taxation of tribal bonds?
Posing the question this way in the context of the infringement doctrine
suggests that my application of the doctrine is inconsistent and illogical.
My position is logical, however, if we recognize two things. First,
states, as I have already explained, have an institutional place in
Congress where unwanted discrimination can be remedied through
explicit federal legislation passed under the Interstate Commerce Clause.
Second, states, at least most of them, have economies that are large
enough to provide investors for their own bonds. In contrast, most tribes
would not have an investor base sufficient to provide buyers for their
bonds. In addition, most states have an income tax, but no tribes, at least
as far as I know, have an income tax. Consequently, tribal members
living on the reservation would receive no tribal income tax incentive
from buying a tribal bond. Admittedly, the federal incentive would still
apply. Nonetheless, the average tribe finds itself in a wholly different
set of fiscal and economic circumstances than does the average state.
Therefore, it makes perfect sense that states should not be able to impose
their income tax on interest from tribal bonds while at the same time
taxing interest on bonds issued by sister states.
328. See Representative Offices, United States House of Representatives, 111th Congress, 1st
Session, http://www.house.gov/house/MemberWWW.shtml (last visited Sept. 20, 2009).
329. See id.
330. S.D. v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998).
331. Ky. Dept. of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1810-11 (2008).
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VI. THE INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE
Under the Constitution, Congress is granted the power to “regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes.”332 The Supreme Court has viewed this language as
creating three separate grants of power to Congress. As a matter of
textual analysis, the Court refers to the powers as located within 1) the
Interstate Commerce Clause,333 2) the Foreign Commerce Clause,334 and
3) the Indian Commerce Clause.335 If and when Congress exercises its
power in one of these spheres, the federal legislation may explicitly or
impliedly preempt state law. In the context of the Indian preemption
doctrine discussed above, I observed that Congress has not explicitly
preempted state income taxation of interest on tribal bonds.336 I asserted,
however, that the Indian preemption doctrine provides a broad sweep in
which a federal legislative presence justifies a balancing of the
respective interests. After balancing those interests, I concluded that the
Indian preemption doctrine should prohibit state income taxation of
interest paid on tribal bonds.337
In this part of the discussion, I investigate whether the Indian
Commerce Clause is like the Interstate Commerce Clause, and whether
the negative implications of the Indian Commerce Clause might prohibit
state income taxation that discriminates against tribal bonds in favor of
in-state bonds. I conclude that there is a dormant prong within the
Indian Commerce Clause.
The Dormant Commerce Clause is a judicial add-on to the
Interstate Commerce Clause contained in the United States
Constitution.338 The text of the clause itself provides Congress with the
power to regulate commerce “among the several States.” Consequently,
the Dormant Commerce Clause comes into play only when Congress has

332. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
333. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273–74 (1988) (emphasizing that
the dormant part of the interstate commerce clause is focused on preventing states from engaging in
economic protectionism).
334. See United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that the Supreme
Court “has read the Foreign Commerce Clause as granting Congress sweeping powers.”).
335. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
177 (1980) (Rehnquist, J, concurring/dissenting) (noting that the Indian Commerce Clause is
separate and prohibits discriminatory state taxation).
336. See discussion supra at notes 175-91.
337. See discussion supra at notes 175-279.
338. See New Energy Co. of Ind., 486 U.S. at 273–74 (1988) (emphasizing that the dormant
part of the Interstate Commerce Clause is focused on preventing states from engaging in economic
protectionism).
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not undertaken legislation that actually regulates interstate commerce.
In such cases, the Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from
undertaking actions that unduly burden339 or discriminate against
interstate commerce.340 In general, the goal of the Dormant Commerce
Clause is to prohibit states from undertaking measures that constitute
economic protectionism.341 In the context of taxation, the Dormant
Commerce Clause generally prohibits states from taxing in a way that
creates an undue burden on, or that discriminates against, interstate
commerce.342
Within the Indian Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court ultimately
rejected the undue burden analysis in cases involving simultaneous tribal
and state taxation but recognized a problem when state taxation
discriminated against a tribe or a tribal interest. In Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, the Court
rejected the undue burden approach where the sale of cigarettes within a
tribe’s reservation was subject to both a state tax and a tribal tax.343 The
Court, however, recognized that states could not impose their taxes in a
way that discriminated against tribes.344 In a concurring/dissenting
opinion, Justice Rehnquist noted that the Indian Commerce Clause, by
implication, prohibits “discriminatory state action.”345
In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, an oil and gas lessee
contested the validity of a tribal severance tax imposed on the lessee’s
mineral extraction activities.346 The lessee asserted, among other things,
that the tribal tax, when combined with the state tax, was invalid as an
undue burden on interstate commerce.347 The Court briefly discussed
the difference between the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Indian
Commerce Clause.348 The Court observed that the Indian Commerce
Clause has a dormant side that serves “as a shield to protect Indian tribes

339. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (stating that in the absence of
discrimination, a state law will be upheld, against the dormant Commerce Clause, “unless the
burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits.”).
340. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (stating that a discriminatory
state law affecting interstate commerce is usually invalid).
341. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988).
342. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179-80 (1995).
343. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 157
(1980).
344. See id.
345. See id. at 177.
346. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 136 (1982).
347. See id.
348. See id. at 153-54.
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from state and local interference.”349 Because the question here involved
the power of the tribe to tax, the Court found that the dormant Indian
Commerce Clause was inapplicable.350 Instead, the Court applied its
Interstate Commerce Clause jurisprudence and found that Congress had
acted affirmatively in this case by providing a statutory and regulatory
regime that included federal approval of the tribal tax.351 The Court
went on to consider whether the tribal tax, assuming no federal action,
would have survived dormant Interstate Commerce Clause scrutiny. The
Court concluded that the tribal tax satisfied the dormant Commerce
Clause test352 laid out in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.353
Specifically, the Court found that the tribal tax did not discriminate
against interstate commerce.354
In Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico, the United States
Supreme Court again considered whether multiple taxation by a state
and a tribe on the same transaction constituted an undue burden on
interstate commerce in violation of the Indian Commerce Clause.355
Cotton Petroleum involved mineral extraction from lands on the Jicarilla
Indian Reservation356 and served to test the validity of state taxation in
the same factual context as the Merrion case. In Cotton Petroleum, the
Court relied on the Colville case357 and rejected the multiple-burden
argument because the New Mexico severance tax was nondiscriminatory.358 The New Mexico tax applied to all oil and gas
produced within the state, whether from Indian or non-Indian lands, and
whether consumed in-state or exported out of state.359 The Court,
however, indicated that a discriminatory tax would be another matter.360
The Court suggested that a discriminatory state tax, one that applied to
tribal wells and not to wells located off the reservation, would be invalid
349. See id.
350. See id. at 154.
351. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 155 (1982).
352. See id.
353. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (allowing a state tax
on interstate commerce if there is nexus, fair apportionment, and no discrimination).
354. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 157-58 (1982). The Court addressed
the issue of whether multiple taxation was an undue burden in footnote 26 of its opinion and
suggested that a state tax might violate the Interstate Commerce Clause as unduly burdensome if the
level of state taxation “is more than the State’s contact with the [taxed] activity would justify.” Id.
355. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
356. See id. at 167.
357. See id. at 188 (citing Colville as implicitly allowing simultaneous tribal and state taxation
on the same activity).
358. See id. at 189.
359. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 189 (1989).
360. See id.
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as a violation of the Indian Commerce Clause.361 This analysis in Cotton
Petroleum suggests that the Indian Commerce Clause does have a
limited negative implication in cases when state taxation discriminates
against the tribe or its interests.
Simple fairness requires that the Indian Commerce Clause should
provide this protection against discriminatory state taxation. If we look
at these two cases in which state taxation was permitted within Indian
country, it is obvious that discriminatory state taxation would have been
unfair and would have violated Indian Commerce Clause principles. In
Colville and Cotton Petroleum, for example, the Court would have found
the state taxes invalid as a violation of the Indian Commerce Clause if
those taxes had applied only on the reservation or at a higher rate for onreservation transactions. This shows that there is actually a dormant
Indian Commerce Clause because the rationale in both cases was based
on the conclusion that Congress had passed no laws otherwise
implicating application of the Indian preemption doctrine. Instead, the
Court in both cases stated that discriminatory state taxation would
violate the Indian Commerce Clause.362 In addition, the Court in
Merrion, as a matter of fundamental principle in federal Indian law,
stated that the Indian Commerce Clause operates to protect tribes from
the exercise of state power.363
In the context of tribal bonds, state income tax rules that allow an
exemption only for in-state bonds discriminate against tribal bonds
issued within the state or by tribes located out-of-state. This is a case of
simple discrimination in which a state taxes interest on all tribal bonds
but provides an exemption for interest on its own bonds. The presence
of discrimination is factually obvious and therefore violates the dormant
Indian Commerce Clause.364
The Davis case, however, permits discriminatory state taxation
against out-of-state bonds by placing the in-state tax preference within
the governmental function exception.365
Under this exception,

361. See id. at 186 (distinguishing its holding from precedent by stating, “This is not a case in
which the State has had nothing to do with the on-reservation activity, save tax it. Nor is this a case
in which an unusually large state tax has imposed a substantial burden on the Tribe.” Id.)
362. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 157
(1980). See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 175 (1989).
363. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 153-54 (1982).
364. For the leading article asserting that there is a dormant Indian Commerce Clause, see
Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055 (1995)
(challenging the correctness of Cotton Petroleum and providing a detailed historical argument in
favor of a dormant Indian Commerce Clause).
365. See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008).
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discrimination against interstate commerce is permitted when the
activity involves the exercise of a core governmental function.366 The
Court sees governmental borrowing and the use of borrowed funds as a
core governmental function.367 The Court then sees the in-state tax
preference as a permissible method of facilitating this borrowing
function.368 In support of its reasoning, the Court points to the long and
pervasive history of virtually all states engaging in discriminatory
taxation and the failure of a single state to oppose the discriminatory
practice through the filing of an amicus curie brief in the case.369 The
Court also notes that Congress seemed aware of the practice but was
unwilling to step in to provide a legislative remedy.370
In the context of tribal bonds, does the Davis case provide a ready
answer to state income taxes that discriminate against interest on tribal
bonds? The dormant Interstate Commerce Clause is no longer a
problem because the Court has placed the in-state tax preference within
the governmental function exception.371 The dormant Indian Commerce
Clause, however, does remain a problem precisely because Colville and
Cotton Petroleum acknowledge that it probably prohibits discriminatory
state taxation.372 Both Colville and Cotton Petroleum were cases where
the validity of the state tax involved reservations located wholly within
the state imposing its tax.373 In the case of tribal bonds, the state income
tax will apply to in-state tribal bonds and to out-of-state tribal bonds.
For example, if a tribe within New York issues bonds and one tribal
bond owner is a resident of New York and another of Minnesota, then
the two situations present substantially different cases.
First, let us consider the New Yorker. The New Yorker who owns
a tribal bond from a tribe located within New York would be subject to
the New York income tax. This tax would discriminate against the tribal
bond solely because the issuer is a tribe. If a city or county within New
366. See id. at 1811.
367. See id. at 1810.
368. See id. at 1811.
369. See id. at 1815-16.
370. See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1819 (2008).
371. See id.
372. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 157
(1980); see Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 175 (1989).
373. Colville, 447 U.S. 134 nn. 12-14 (“The Colville Reservation encompasses 1.3 million
acres in the north-eastern section of Washington . . . . The Lummi Reservation encompasses 7,319
acres, most of them on a peninsula near Bellingham, Wash. . . . . The Makah Reservation
encompasses 28,000 acres at the northwest tip of the Olympic Peninsula.”); Cotton Petroleum, 490
U.S. at 166 (“All 742,135 acres of the Jicarilla Apache Reservation are located in northwestern New
Mexico.”).
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York located right next to the tribe issued its own bond, then the in-state
bond would be exempt from the New York income tax. Except for the
presence of a discriminatory state tax, these hypothetical facts are very
close to the facts in Colville and Cotton Petroleum, cases in which the
Court seemed rather firm in its commitment to protect the tribes from
discriminatory state taxation.
On New York’s side, the state could still argue, as Kentucky did in
Davis, that state and local borrowing is a core governmental function
that can be promoted through the granting of a tax exemption for in-state
bonds. New York would need to argue that the tribe, although
physically located within the state, is politically separate from the state
and has sufficient and independent sovereignty to borrow its own funds,
just like a sister state. In fact, New York could contend that the federal
law granting federal income tax exemption for interest on tribal bonds
reclassifies the tribe as a state in order to create the exemption. On its
side, the tribe’s best argument would be that the dormant Indian
Commerce Clause is designed to protect tribes from the exercise of state
powers that harm the tribe’s sovereignty. New York income taxation of
the interest on the tribal bond directly increases the tribe’s borrowing
costs and adversely affects the exercise of a core governmental function:
borrowing money. In addition, the tribe could argue that it, like almost
all other tribes, lacks the economic base of individual states sufficient to
sell bonds to resident tribal members. Finally, the tribe could assert that
its bond issue, along with other tribal bond issues, is such a small part of
the tax-exempt bond market that it would not adversely affect New
York’s cost of borrowing.
Switching now to the Minnesotan who buys a tribal bond from a
New York tribe, we see that Colville and Cotton Petroleum lose their
factual similarity. Here, Minnesota could argue that it is treating all outof-state governmental bonds the same by subjecting their interest income
to the state income tax. Under this line of argument, the Supreme Court
might very well find that the dormant Indian Commerce Clause does not
apply because there is no discrimination, except in the case of tribes
located within Minnesota.374 Nonetheless, the tribe in New York could
still show discrimination, but the Court would likely draw a parallel to
the Davis case.

374. See MINN. STAT. § 290.01(19a)(1)(iii) (2008) (treating bonds issued by tribes located
within Minnesota the same as in-state bonds).
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The Davis case, however, should not extend to out-of-state tribal
bonds precisely because tribes are not states.375 Tribes, unlike states,
lack representation in Congress.376 Tribes do not impose income taxes
and, therefore, are not in a position to favor their own bonds through an
income tax exemption.377 No single tribe has an economy as big as the
state with the smallest economy.378 Because tribes have not had a
history of bond issuing, they have not been in a position to participate in
a nation-wide system granting an in-state tax exemption for in-state
bonds. Finally, most tribes lack the political representation within states
to secure equality of treatment as in-state bond issuers.379
A conclusive resolution of the issue must await a Supreme Court
decision, remedial federal legislation, or a pro-tribe approach adopted by
individual states.

375. Cotton Petroleum emphatically makes this point. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192-93 (1989).
376. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383-84 (1896) (finding that subject to Congressional
authority, the United States Constitution does not apply to strictly internal affairs of the Cherokee
nation, because it is a “distinct, independent political” community). Accord, Solis v. Matheson, 563
F.3d 425, 429-30 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Indian tribes have a special status as sovereigns with limited
powers. Indian tribes are dependent on, and subordinate to the federal government, yet retain
powers of self-government.”); United States v. Red Bird, 146 F.Supp. 2d 993, 999 (D.S.D. 2001)
(stating that neither the Sixth Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment apply to tribal court
matters). See also Scott A. Taylor, The Unending Onslaught on Tribal Sovereignty: State Income
Taxation of Non-member Indians, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 917, 950-54 (2008).
377. A rare exception is the Sac and Fox Tribe, which imposes an earnings tax that is similar to
an income tax. See Sac and Fox Nation, Tax Commission, http://www.sacandfoxnationnsn.gov/dept_deta.htm?id=2453143.61891204 (last visited Sept. 27, 2009); Sac and Fox Nation v.
Okla. Tax Comm’n, 967 F.2d 1425, 1427 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting the Sac and Fox Nation’s
imposition of an income tax on its members whose income was also subject to another layer of
income taxation by Oklahoma).
378. This is a reasonable inference to be drawn from 2006 U.S. Census data showing Native
Americans as the group suffering the highest level of poverty. See, e.g., Tax Expenditures:
Available Data are Insufficient to Determine the Use and Impact of Indian Reservation
Depreciation, GAO Report 08-731, (June 2008):
Indians continue to experience economic distress and lag behind other groups in the
United States on key economic indicators, such as employment and median household
income, as they have for years in the past. For example, according to the 2006 U.S.
Census information, American Indians’ median household income was about $15,000
less than the median of all households in the United States. American Indians also had
the highest poverty rate of all Census ethnic categories, at 26.6 percent.
Id.at 1 (footnote omitted).
379. See Taylor, supra note 125, at 886-87.
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VII. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
circumscribes a state’s power to engage in racial discrimination.380 So,
for example, if a state varied its tax rate based on race, then such a tax
would be unconstitutional unless the state could provide a compelling
state interest to justify such taxation.381 In the context of tribal bonds,
states whose income taxation of bond interest discriminates based on the
in-state/out-of-state distinction should be able to survive constitutional
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the discrimination is not racial but geographical.
For example, imposing the Wisconsin income tax382 on all bonds issued
by governmental entities located outside the boundaries of the state does
not discriminate against tribal bonds as a separate category. Instead, the
discrimination is based on the bond issuer’s location outside of
Wisconsin, whether the issuer is the City of New York or the Navajo
Nation.
The problem of racial discrimination, however, does arise for a
state with an income tax that applies to tribal bonds issued by tribes
located within that state’s boundaries. In California, for example,
exemption from state income taxation extends only to bonds issued by
the state or by local governments.383 California has more than 100
federally recognized Indian tribes located within its boundaries.384 Any
bonds issued by these tribes would be subject to the California income
tax because that state defines income as all income and specifically
excludes only interest on bonds issued by the state and by local
governments.385

380. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 providing that no state shall “deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
381. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324-25 (2003) (subjecting race-conscious
admissions to a state-supported law school to the compelling-state-interest analysis, which
presumably would apply in the context of state taxation).
382. See WIS. STAT. § 71.05(1)(c) (2008) (extending exemption from the Wisconsin income
tax only for enumerated bonds, all of which must be issued within the state).
383. See CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 17133 (2008) (extending exemption only to bonds issued by
state and local governments of California).
384. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services From the United States
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 73 Fed. Reg. 18553-57 (April 4, 2008).
385. See Analysis of SB 995: Exemption/Interest On Bonds Issued By Federally Recognized
Indian Tribal Government Located In This State (California Legislature 2005),
http://www.ftb.ca.gov/law/legis/05_06bills/sb995_022205.pdf (explaining how the interest from
tribal bonds issued by in-state tribes are subject to the California income tax). California never
enacted this proposed legislation.
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Precisely stated, is the state income taxation based on the race of
the tribe issuing the bond? Arguably, this is the case. A federally
recognized Indian tribe is a distinct political entity comprised of
members.386 Membership in a tribe is a question of tribal selfdetermination.387 In general, tribes adopt membership rules as part of
their law-making process.388 These membership rules usually require
some genetic connection in the form of blood quantum or ancestry.389
As a result, one could argue that many or most federally recognized
Indian tribes are political entities that use race as a qualifying
characteristic for membership.390
Stated another way, a tribe’s
membership is very often comprised of Native Americans based on
some form of ancestral connection.
Therefore, if a state exempts the interest income of a bond issued
by one of its cities but refuses a comparable exemption for interest
income earned on a tribal bond issued by a tribe located geographically
within the state, then reason for the discrimination is arguably racial. If
so, then the state would need a compelling reason to engage in such
racial discrimination.
The leading case on racial discrimination involving Native
Americans is Morton v. Mancari.391 In Mancari, the United States
Supreme Court decided that a federal hiring preference for Native
Americans was not unlawful racial discrimination because the
classification of a person as a Native American was political, not
racial.392 If we apply the Mancari rationale to state income taxation in
the tribal bond setting, then we must conclude that the factor justifying
the discrimination is a political one and not a racial one. In Mancari, the
Court concluded that the hiring preference practice was justified by a

386. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) (observing that “Indian nations
had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original
natural rights.”).
387. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (citing Roff v. Burney, 168
U.S. 218 (1897), which confirmed that membership decisions were within the exclusive power of
the tribe).
388. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 526-27 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
389. See id.
390. See Rose Cuison Villazor, Blood Quantum Land Laws and the Race Versus Political
Identity Dilemma, 96 CAL. L. REV. 801, 805-6 (2008) (identifying potential equal protection
problems associated with political classifications based on blood quantum).
391. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
392. See id. at n. 24. “The preference is not directed towards a ‘racial’ group consisting of
‘Indians’; instead, it applies only to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes. This operates to
exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified as ‘Indians.’ In this sense, the preference
is political rather than racial in nature.” Id.
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rational purpose.393 Presumably, then, a state could find a rational
purpose for taxing in-state tribal bonds. Such a state would have to
argue that the political separation of the tribe from the state is just as
clear as the political separation of one state from another. Accordingly,
a state can promote its own bonds by not allowing an exemption for
bonds issued by politically separate tribes.
The Mancari line of analysis, which focuses on political status and
not racial status, is somewhat artificial because federally recognized
Indian tribes are both politically separate and, in many cases, racially
distinct. Perhaps it is best to acknowledge the presence of both of these
two characteristics. The next step, then, should be to determine whether
the discriminatory state taxation operates primarily at a political level or
a racial level. The Davis case seems to answer the question by noting
that those states that tax bond interest from bonds issued out-of-state are
doing so to promote their own in-state bonds.394 The discrimination is
wholly political and favors the local interest and, therefore, does not
amount to racial discrimination.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The exercise of a state’s power in a way that adversely impacts the
sovereignty of a federally recognized Indian tribe has been a matter of
serious concern to the United States Supreme Court since 1832.395 The
limit of a state’s power to tax is very often the subject of judicial
concern.396 In this article, I have investigated the limitations that states
may face when they impose their income taxes on interest that investors
earn on bonds issued by federally recognized Indian tribes. I have
concluded that such state taxation is barred by the Indian preemption
doctrine. The federal legislation that granted exemption for such interest
for federal income tax purposes has the strength and breadth to preempt
state income taxation. State income taxation of interest on tribal bonds
also infringes tribal sovereignty. This infringement operates as an
independent and second bar to state taxation. A third barrier to state
taxation is the Indian Commerce Clause. Case law supports the
conclusion that states cannot exempt in-state activities while taxing onreservation ones. The Davis case now allows states to discriminate
against one another in the taxation of bond income. But this form of

393.
394.
395.
396.

Id. at 555.
Ky. Dept. of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1810-11 (2008).
See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
See, e.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
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discrimination does not and should not apply to federally recognized
Indian tribes, because they occupy a totally different political and
economic place in the United States. Finally, I have concluded that state
discrimination against tribal bonds does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because tribes are primarily
political, rather than racial, communities. Accordingly, a state would
have a rational purpose for discriminating against tribal bonds in favor
of its own bonds. Nonetheless, the Indian preemption doctrine, state
infringement of tribal sovereignty, and the dormant Indian Commerce
Clause stand as independent barriers to a state’s power to impose its
income tax on interest from tribal bonds.
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